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THE SHIFT TOWARD MANAGED CARE AND EMERGING
LIABILITY CLAIMS ARISING FROM UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT
AND FINANCIL INCENTIVE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND PAYERS
Brian P. Battaglia"
All these years, [providers] have been concerned
with fighting socialized medicine, and now they've
been blind-sided by capitalism.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The entire system of managed care ("managed care" or "managed
competition") has again come under attack due to recently publicized lawsuits
and incidents focusing on injuries and deaths resulting from decisions that
limited or denied medical care to patients. In light of these events, consumers
of health care and the media have questioned whether such decisions were
undertaken with the patient's best interests in mind or merely for the purpose
of saving another health care dollar.
As a result of these concerns, it is imperative that consumers, the media,
and health care professionals understand the factors which necessitated the
transformation of health care delivery and provider reimbursement toward
managed care and competition. The courts, deciding cost containment liability
claims, must well understand events leading up to the present metamorphosis
in the delivery of health care, and the critical part cost containment and
financial risk shifting play in the managed care formula. With such knowledge,
courts will be better suited to render legal decisions that can chart a course for
providers, utilization managers, and legal professionals, who must navigate the
newly discovered managed care liability waters. Such decisions will provide
much needed guidance as to when and under what circumstances, cost
containment mechanisms become instruments simply to enhance the provider's
bottom line to the detriment of the consumer.
Managed care and managed competition are relatively new terms in health
care terminology. Therefore, much of the confusion and doubt as to what these
systems entail is the result of the health care industry's failure to skillfully
explain to the public terms relating to cost containment delivery systems, such
as health maintenance organization (HMO), preferred provider organization
(PPO), physician-hospital organization (PHO) or integrated delivery systems
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(IDS). 2 Simply defined, managed care is a framework for maintaining costs
associated with the delivery of health care at acceptable levels through the use
of systems, such as HMOs and PPOs.3 In order to control costs, alternative
delivery systems put in place policies which are intended to avoid unwarranted
medical care. In addition, procedures such as pre-admission certification,
concurrent review, discharge planning, case management, and utilization
management are also relied upon as cost control measures.'
Managed competition, on the other hand, relies upon market forces to
shape health care delivery into an efficient and cost conscious system.
Specifically, managed competition organizes employers, health plans, and
individuals into large purchasing alliances which negotiate price with
numerous payers upon terms that, in many instances, result in the provider
bearing a portion of the financial risk in the delivery of care.5 Thus, providers
must compete on price with other providers of health care in order to secure
contracts which will provide patients and income. Importantly, as a result of
risk shifting, once providers secure such contracts, it is often necessary for
them to modify behavior so as to avoid the practice of defensive medicine or
the prescription of needless, costly care.
Interestingly, managed care systems of today are, in many respects, the
offspring of cooperatives and other alternative delivery systems, programs first
implemented more than 50 years ago.6 Therefore, in order to understand why
cost containment has seemingly been thrust upon America's health care system
overnight, this paper will first outline for the reader the forces which slowed
the growth of alternative health care delivery systems and how skyrocketing
costs ultimately diverted the traditional system of fee for service onto the path
of managed care. In retracing this history, it will become evident why evolving
systems of managed care have become the standard bearer, and potentially,
without significant government intervention, the last hope for reducing health
care costs. Second, this paper will explain the distinctions between the various
managed care and integrated delivery systems incorporating cost containment
mechanisms, such as utilization management and financial incentive arrange-
ments. Third, emerging cost containment liability claims with respect to
utilization management and financial incentive arrangements between health
care providers and payers, and the impact recent cases interpreting the
2. See infra notes 164-90 and accompanying text.
3. LEGAL MEDICiNE 663 (3d ed. 1995).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. These original pre-paid health care plans revolved around similar group characteristics
such as employment, religion, and ethnic background. See Randolph E. Sarnacki, Comment,
Contractual Theories ofRecovery in the HMO Provider-Subscriber Relationship: Prospective
Litigation for Breach of Contract, 36 BuFF. L. REv. 119, 120 n.3 (1.987).
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Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 may have on these
emerging claims will be outlined for the reader. In addressing emerging cost
containment liability claims, this paper will discuss the steps managed care
entities should take to reduce their exposure from such claims.
II. THE FALL OF TRADITIONAL HEALTH CARE: THE RISE OF MANAGED
CARE
As will be detailed below, America's move toward industrialization not
only provided private enterprise and entrepreneurial physicians the opportunity
to increase the delivery of medical care to employers and citizens, but it also
provided the incentive to develop new systems so that employers and citizens
could pay for such care.
A. Development of Private Health Insurance
Any form of health insurance coverage in America was sparse, if existent,
during the late nineteenth and early portions of the twentieth century.7 Most
early insurance companies providing health benefits, usually went out of
business in quick fashion.8 Toward the latter part of the nineteenth century,
some companies began to offer coverage for certain diseases and disability
coverage. 9 However, as of around 1920, very few Americans had medical
insurance. 10 Even during this period, with respect to small but noticeable
increases in health care costs, concerns arose. One study, conducted in 1918,
revealed that 7.6% of the average total medical charge of $48.41 went toward
hospital services."
7. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 200-01,235-89,
335-49 (1982). Although there were movements initiated by labor and social progressives in
the early part of this century supporting government sponsored compulsory health insurance,
the medical profession had strong objections to these plans. For the most part, compulsory
insurance movements would gain momentum, surge, and, in most instances, trickle away.
Some form of debate, and in several instances, proposed legislation relating to a national
insurance system has been seen in almost each administration since Woodrow Wilson's. In
most instances, legislation was either defeated or significantly watered down, with the most
recent coming in the Clinton administration with the defeat of the Health Security Act.
8. Id. at 241.
9. Id. Most of the plans were usually for the sole purpose of supplementing lost income
as a result of a work related injury. Id.
10. Id. at 242.
11. Id. at 259. Costs associated with health care and its availability to citizens was a
concern when the National Committee on the Costs of Medical Care was formed in 1926.
Members of this committee consisted of individuals in the medical, public health, and social
science fields. The committee's chairman, Dr. Ray L. Wilbur, served in the Hoover
administration as Secretary of the Interior. Information obtained by the committee from surveys
1997]
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However, by 1929 that figure had risen to 13%, with $108.00 going
toward hospital reimbursement. 2 And by 1934, 40% of the average family's
medical bill was for hospital and in-patient related physician charges."
Because of these increases, medical expenditures were no longer isolated to the
wage earner, rather a greater proportion of families aggregate incomes were
being impacted by health care costs.
14
Unfortunately, the collapse of America's economy during the 1930's
prevented many citizens from even considering medical care. Not only did the
general population suffer from decreased medical care, physicians and hospitals
had great difficulty surviving.1' By 1930, many hospital beds were empty and
income had dropped significantly compared to what had been generated during
the decade of the 1920's.' 6 In an effort to address these problems, hospitals
would provide care to those individuals who were subscribers of newly
developed prepaid hospital health care plans. 7 These first hospital sponsored
plans evolved into what later became known as Blue Cross plans."8 In light of
the developments in health care payment mechanisms during the 1930's,
private insurance companies saw a potential for profit and developed insurance
products such as indemnity coverage which initially paid for hospital care.
Later, coverage under these policies was expanded to pay for physician
services.' 9 In response to private insurance carriers expansion into the market,
Blue Shield plans developed coverage which paid for physician services as
well. 20
taken from close to 9,000 families indicated that those families with the lowest incomes (less
than $1,200 annually) received more types of health care due to charity care than families with
higher incomes, but overall each income segment failed to receive the amount of medical
services necessary for good care. Interestingly, the committee endorsed pre-paid health plans
as a cost effective way for providing health care to citizens. See infra note 43; American
Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 246-47 n.65 (D.C. Cir. 1942)(citation omitted).
12. STARR, supra note 7, at 259.
13. STARR, supra note 7, at 259.
14. STARR, supra note 7, at 260.
15. BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAW, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 534 (2d
ed. 1991).
16. Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review and Financial Risk Shifting:
Compensating Patients For Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SoUND L.
REV. 1, 11 (1993) (noting that hospital receipts in the 1920s were as high as $236.12 and dipped
to $59.26 by 1930. Occupancy rates went from 71.28% to 64.12%).
17. Randall, supra note 16, at 11. In 1929, Baylor University Hospital was one of the
first, when for $6 per person per year it provided a large group of school teachers with 21 days
of hospital care. Randall, supra note 16, at 11.
18. Randall, supra note 16, at 11-12.
19. Randall, supra note 16, at 11-12.
20. Randall, supra note 16, at 11-12.
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B. Early Forerunners of Managed Care
For companies that employed many workers or were in high health risk
industries, proper health care delivery was necessary in order to maintain a
healthy work force. In some instances, companies hired physicians to provide
health care for their employees." Railroad companies were far ahead of any
other businesses in the industrial sector in the provision of health care services
to employees.22 Medical services were necessary as a result of the railroads
rather high injury rates and the expansion of rail service to isolated areas in the
western part of the country.23 Physicians supplying medical services for
employees of industry were often employed by the companies. Interestingly,
in other instances, the physicians or hospitals contracted directly with a
company which paid a set rate for each worker on a monthly basis.24 From the
viewpoint of the few physicians who saw the opportunity, a stable (and
prepaid) group of patients could provide a reliable revenue stream. Organized
medicine's response to these innovations introduced a theme which continues
to this day, in one form or another.' The medical profession viewed company
controlled medicine with suspicion and viciously attacked the entrepreneurial
physicians who were creating cooperatives or entering into prepaid agreements
with employee groups or employers. 26 For example, physicians such as
Michael Shadid were attacked by the medical profession in the late 1920's for
establishing medical cooperatives. Dr. Shadid established a medical coopera-
tive for approximately 6000 farm families in and around Elk City, Oklahoma.27
For his efforts, other physicians labeled him "unethical," attempted to revoke
his license, and, ultimately, the local medical society deprived him of
malpractice insurance. 2' A company doctor at Sears & Roebuck Company in
Chicago resigned after the local medical society stripped him of his member-
21. STARR, supra note 7, at 200-01.
22. STARR, supra note 7, at 201 (noting that the textile, mining, and lumbering industries
also provided medical care to their workers).
23. STARR, supra note 7, at 201.
24. STARR, supra note 7, at 202.
25. STARR, supra note 7, at 203. The medical profession's position has been that it is not
proper to sell services to anyone but the patient. In addition, associations representing
physicians took the position that to sell services to third party payers or related corporate
practice would interfere with the physician's ethical obligation to the patient See Kartell v. Blue
Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 926 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing Comment, The
American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE
L.J. 938, 978-80 (1954) and American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics, ch.
3, art. 5, § 4)).
26. STARR, supra note 7, at 203.
27. STARR, supra note 7, at 303.
28. STARR, supra note 7, at 303.
19971
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ship arguing that his reduced rate services to family members of employees
was unethical, and in conflict with his colleagues in private practice.29
In 1929, two physicians in Los Angeles contracted with a large group of
employees with the city's water and power department. A short six years later,
what had by then become known as the Ross-Loos Clinic was providing
services to over 12,000 workers and their dependents.30 Studies during this
period indicated that medical costs for those employees contracting with Ross-
Loos Clinic were approximately half of those incurred by similarly situated
individuals not associated with Ross-Loos3 Despite these positive figures, the
founders of the Ross-Loos Clinic were thrown out of the local medical
society.32 Such conduct was not limited to individual physicians or local
medical societies. The American Medical Association (AMA) also objected
to cooperative medicine. Originally founded in the late 1840's, the AMA was
a powerful force to be reckoned with by the 1930's. 33 Not only did the AMA
vocally object to such cost efficient practices, it undertook a campaign to stop
activities it considered "unlicensed, unregulated health insurance and the
corporate practice of medicine."'
One of many such campaigns began as a result of the opening of the
Group Health Association (GHA) in November of 1937. GHA was a not-for-
profit cooperative association of government employees in Washington D.C.35
GHA was in the business of arranging for the provision of medical care and
hospitalization to its subscribers and their dependents on a risk sharing pre-
payment basis.36 In order to provide reduced health care services, GHA
collected monthly dues from its subscribers. These funds were in turn used to
employ a medical staff which consisted of salaried general practitioners and
29. STARR, supra note 7, at 203.
30. STARR, supra note 7, at 301 (pointing out that the clinic was named after its founders,
Dr. Donald Ross and Dr. H. Clifford Loos).
31. STARR, supra note 7, at 301. Interestingly, such prepaid group practices existed well
before the Committee on the Cost of Medical Care expressed support for such plans in 1933.
See THE CORPORATE TRANSFORMATION OF HEALTH CARE, PART 1, IssuEs & DIRECTIONS 87
(J. Warren Salmon ed., 1990). In 1933, Dr. Sidney R. Garfield established a prepaid plan for
construction workers who were building an aqueduct to provide water for Los Angeles,
California. The workers paid a small fee from their wages for the medical coverage. Little did
Dr. Garfield know, that a few short years later, he would be persuaded by Henry J. Kaiser to
implement this group practice prepaid plan for workers building the Grand Coulee Dam. From
these beginnings arose one of the pioneers in managed care: Kaiser Permanente. See HMO, vol.
136, no. 3, May-June 1995, at 94.
32. STARR, supra note 7, at 304.
33. STAR, supra note 7, at 90-91. In 1846, a convention was convened in New York for
the purpose of creating a national medical association. STARR, supra note 7, at 90-91.
34. STARR, supra note 7, at 305.
35. United States v. American Medical Ass'n., 110 F.2d 703, 705-06 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
36. Id.
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specialists who were engaged in a group practice under the guidance of a
medical director.37 As a result of GHA's conduct, the AMA, along with local
medical societies, carried out a course of conduct intended to prevent GHA
from securing and retaining the services of qualified physicians or using
hospital facilities in the District of Columbia.38 In part, the AMA and the local
medical societies threatened disciplinary action against doctors who joined
GHA or who consulted with GHA staff physicians. Hospitals were threatened
with retaliation if GHA physicians were permitted to use their facilities.39
The AMA and related parties' conduct did not escape the notice of the
United States Department of Justice, which obtained indictments against the
AMA and others for violations of federal anti-trust laws. The government
alleged that the conduct carried out by the defendants was consistent with the
AMA's previous pattern of conduct and policy of discouraging and suppressing
group medical practices which operated on a risk sharing pre-payment basis.40
The AMA, along with the other defendants moved to dismiss the
indictment. The motions to dismiss were granted by the district court.4 The
district court's decision was appealed by the government and reversed by the
circuit court,42 and a trial was held. As a result of the anti-competitive conduct
orchestrated by the AMA, the government obtained convictions which were
later affirmed.43 Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the
case, upholding the convictions of 1943." The Supreme Court found that the
AMA had violated the provisions of § 3 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with
its members to restrain trade and commerce in the District of Columbia. 45 The
Court indicated that one of the driving forces behind the AMA's concerted
action against GHA was its efforts to proliferate the prevailing sentiment of
AMA members that all physicians should practice independently (without
government or any other interference) on a fee for service basis.'
One would think that as a result of the high court's decision in 1943,
programs similar to GHA's (essentially a staff model health maintenance
organization) would have quickly expanded. However, several factors would
delay the formal acceptance of alternative cost containment systems (ACCS's)
37. Id. at 706.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 706-07.
40. Id. at 711-12 (noting that the AMA's Bureau of Economics took a leading part in
suppressing group medical practice plans).
41. United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 28 F. Supp. 752 (D. D.C. 1939).
42. 110 F.2d 703 (1940).
43. American Medical Ass'n. v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
44, American Medical Ass'n. v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).




for another 30 years.47 First and foremost, physicians avoided ACCS's in that
they were not willing to subject themselves to the wrath of the AMA or local
medical societies, which as previously discussed, could lead to censure, and in
some instances, professional discipline.48 Second, state laws enacted at the
behest of the medical profession permitted the development of ACCS's, but
only as long as they were under the control of physicians or approved by local
medical societies.49
C. The Rise of the Medical Industrial Complex
As mentioned above, not only did private health care coverage begin to
increase during the 1930's, developments during World War I1 lead to a greater
incentive to provide health care.5° The incentives for providing additional care
arose out of Internal Revenue Service rulings in the early 1940's, rulings that
tentatively indicated that health care benefits provided to employees by the
employer were deductible.5' In addition, unions were permitted to negotiate
with employers on issues such as health care, without violating the wage
stabilization guidelines in effect during World War ."52 After the war, health
insurance continued to expand and by 1950 it was a $1 billion per year
business. A short 15 years later it had become a $8.7 billion per year
business.
53
The significant involvement of the medical community in the war effort
and the experiences from that effort also resulted in improvements to surgical
technique and in-patient and out-patient hospital organization.54 During the
war, various military branches operated ambulatory facilities which provided
care to dependents of military personnel.55 Thus, greater effectiveness in
distributing health care was yet another factor which led not only to the
47. See Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914
(1973) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
48. STARR, supra note 7, at 305.
49. Id. at 306. The corporate practice of medicine doctrine also prevented the development
of ACCS's outside of the control or oversight of the medical profession.
50. ELI GINZBERG, THE ROADTO REFORM: THE FUTuRE OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 62-
63 (1994). By 1991, over 178 million Americans paid for their health care through private
insurance plans at a cost of approximately $222.4 billion. See 2 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW TREATISE, vol. 2, p. 2 (1995).
51. GINzBERG, supra note 50, at 62.
52. GINzBERG, supra note 50, at 62. See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
53. KAREN DAVIS ET AL., HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT 11 (1990).
54. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 61.
55. GINZBERG,supra note 50, at 61.
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increased demand for those services after the war, but also fueled Congress's
willingness to continue funding for research.1
6
The evidence suggests that during the first four decades of the twentieth
century medicine in the private sector was evolving from a "caring" to a
"curing" mode.57 Patient records from major teaching hospitals during the
early part of this century reveal that patient per diem costs were approximately
$5.00, which today would be about $50.00. Comparing these figures to
today's average cost of $1,000.00 per diem at a teaching facility reflects the
trend toward high maintenance (and cost) health care.58 The coming together
of the many interrelated and independent events, including increased
government expenditures in medical research completed the "caring" to
"curing" metamorphosis which also led to significant increases in health care
expenditures.
As America's economy expanded after World War II, so did its appetite
for health care services and coverage. The government continued to play an
ever growing part in that expansion. In 1950, America spent approximately
$12 billion on health care. This amount represented 4.5% of the gross
domestic product.5 9  Between 1929 and 1950, spending on health care
increased at a rate of less than $400 million per year.60 The reasons for such
modest increases during this 20 year period can in some respects be attributed
to America's economic problems resulting from the market collapse in 1929,
limited government expenditures prior to the advent of World War II,61 and
consumer accountability for health care costs.62
Ironically, prior to the 1920's, government expenditures were for the most
part limited to medical research which indirectly arose out of the specialization
movement that began in the 1800's.63 For the most part, government expendi
56. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 61.
57. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 61.
58. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 61.
59. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 60.
60. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 60. In 1929, health care expenditures were $3.66 billion
or $30 per capita. See STARR, supra note 7, at 262.
61. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 60.
62., KEITH J. MUELLER, HEALTH CARE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATEs 61-63 (1993).
During the 1930s and 1940s, the consumer of health care services paid a large portion of
medical costs out-of-pocket. In 1950, the consumer paid approximately 83% of charges
incurred, with insurance paying 11.4%. By 1967, direct share of patient payments had
decreased to 50% with the insurance side increasing to 29%. Statistics from the Health Care
Financing Administration indicated that by 1990 out-of-pocket payments by the patient were
only 20.4% of total health care expenditures. Payment by insurance represented 32.5% with
a remainder reflecting government expenditures of 42% and other private payments of 4.9%.
Id.
63. VERNON W. LIPPAPD, A HALF-CENTURY OF AMERICAN MEDICAL EDUCATION: 1920-
1970,4-5 (1974); see LESTER S. KING, AMERICAN MEDICINE CoMEs OF AGE: 1840-1920,88-93
1997]
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tures for research were carried on in government owned facilities.64 As a result
of the depression and a shift in social priorities during the Roosevelt adminis-
tration, government support for research increased.65 In 1937, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) were authorized by Congress to establish a National
Cancer Institute which was to perform independent research.66 In addition,
Congress permitted grants to be awarded to non-government researchers
approved by the Public Health Service. 67 During and after the war, there was
a focus on research and increases in funding. This is evident in a comparison
of the NIH's budgets from 1947 to 1950. In three short years, NIH's research
budget grew from $4 million to $46.3 million.6s By 1951, total funds spent on
research nationwide reached $181 million.69
Congress's post-war spending also reflected an increased demand for
health services. In 1946, Congress passed the Hospital Survey and Construc-
tion Act (Hill-Burton) which authorized funds for the construction of hospitals
across the country. During the next twenty-four years under Hill-Burton, the
government appropriated $3.7 billion toward hospital construction with $9.1
billion in matching funds contributed by states and local governments.70 Not
only did increased government support lay a foundation for greater access to
health care, such access also resulted in continued growth in private health
insurance plans.71
In addition to the Hill-Burton Act, in 1946 Congress enacted public law
293, which created the Veteran's Administration's Department of Medicine
and Surgery and authorized it to include (and pay for) medical residents in its
(1984).
64. STARR, supra note 7, at 340.
65. LIPPARD, supra note 63, at 73-74.
66. STARR, supra note 7, at 338-40. The NIH was originally organized as the Hygienic
Laboratory in 1887. See LIPPARD, supra note 63, at 73.
67. STARR, supra note 7, at 340. The Public Health Service was created in two phases
between 1902 and 1912 in an expansion of the Marine Hospital Service which was created in
1870. STARR, supra note 7, at 340.
68. M. Gregg Bloche, Corporate Takeover of Teaching Hospitals, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1035, 1046-47 (1992).
69. STARR, supra note 7, at 343.
70. STARR, supra note 7, at 348-50.
71. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 64; MUELLER, supra note 62, at 61-63. Indemnity
insurance coverage was the traditional method used in paying for health care. Under this
system, the care was provided by the physician, and a bill was submitted to the insurance
company for payment. If the insurance policy covered the procedure, the physician was paid
on a fee-for-service basis. Typically, this meant that the physician, who determined the charge,
was reimbursed in full. The fee-for-service system has been criticized for causing excessive
utilization and a resulting increase in health care expenditures. See Deven C. McGraw,
Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians Be Required to Disclose These to
Patients?, 83 GEo. L.J. 1821, 1821-22 (1995).
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hospitals. 72 By 1948, sixty-eight veteran's hospitals had affiliated with fifty-
eight medical schools with that number increasing to seventy-seven by 1965. 73
The NIH's budget, which as previously mentioned was $46.3 million in 1950,
had grown to $400 million by 1960.74 Slowdown of government funding was
nowhere in sight. Not only had government funding for research increased, but
government funding to increase the number of physicians in America loomed
just over the horizon. In light of this unprecedented growth in funding,
hospitals as well as physicians prospered, resulting in the dilution of the
AMA's penchant for opposing third-party responsibility in the administration
or payment of health care. 75 A projected shortage of medical professionals in
America led to the publication of a report entitled Physicians For a Growing
America in 1959.76 As a result of that report, Congress enacted the Health
Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1963 (HPEAA).77 Under HPEAA,
the federal government was to provide matching funds for the construction of
medical schools and expansion of older facilities, including teaching hospitals.
In addition, federal funds were provided to schools that were able to increase
first year classes by five percent.7"
D. The Medicare Program and Spiraling Health Care Costs
The historical efforts designed to enhance access to and increase
expenditures for health care paled in comparison to Congress's enactment of
the Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1965. 79 In part enacted to provide
security to the increasing number of retired elderly who had no health care
coverage, the Medicare program was passed only after concessions were made
to pacify lingering fears from medical professionals concerning possible
interference in the provider-patient relationship and to appease those in the
medical community who opposed the program.80 These concessions included
retention of the fee-for-service payment system based upon physicians'
customary, prevailing, and reasonable rates for the practice area.8 ' Hospitals
were also protected in that reimbursement was calculated on the basis of their
72. LIPPARD, supra note 63, at 70.
73. LIPPARD, supra note 63, at 70-72.
74. STARR, supra note 7, at 347.
75. ELI GINZBERG ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL EDUCATION 2-3 (1993).
76. LIPPARD, supra note 63, at 117-20.
77. LIPPARD, supra note 63, at 118.
78. LIPPARD, supra note 63, at 118.
79. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (collectively
referred to as the Medicare Program).
80. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 68-69.
81. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 68-69.
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costs. 8 2 These concessions led to a dramatic increase in health care expendi-
tures, which later played a part in the move toward managed care."a
In 1965, federal spending on health care was $4.8 billion.8 A few short
years later, Congress took note of the rapid increase in health care costs due,
in large part, to Medicare expenditures.' These increases were directly related
to the formulas for payment discussed above, which were included in the
Medicare legislation by Congress. These reimbursement methods, which were
largely adopted by non-government payers, upset the difficult fiscal balancing
act hospitals, physicians, patients, and payers had engaged in prior to the
Medicare program.
6
A mere five years after the passage of the Medicare program, government
expenditures for health care had risen 12 percent, with per capita expenditures
increasing from $198 in 1965 to $334 in 1970.7 Approximately $64 billion
was spent on health care in 1970.8 The factors which caused such modest
increases in health expenditures during the first half of the century ultimately
set in motion a chain of events that resulted in health care expenditures
escalating to such extremes during the last half of the century. Recognizing
this increase, the chief executive officer of one company declared:
What are these health care guys doing to us? Can't they get their costs
under control? We can't pass any more costs on to our customers. We're
worried that further cost sharing by our employees will be unacceptable
and will lead some to drop their health care altogether! We know that
many dependents are not protected! 89
National health expenditures continued to escalate as referenced in the
following chart:' °
82. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 68-69.
83. The reimbursement system under the Medicare program rewarded those providers who
increased utilization and expenditures on capital costs. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 68-69.
84. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 69-70.
85. ODIN W. ANDERSON, HEALTH SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES: A GROWTH
ENTERPRISE SINCE 1875, 201 (1985).
86. GINZBERG, supra note 50, at 75. Under Medicare, hospitals were reimbursed
retrospectively, receiving payment for reasonable and necessary costs for patient care. As a
result there was essentially no reason to operate efficiently. See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 53,
at 15.
87. ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 201.
88. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 164.
89. DEAN C. CODDINGTON ET AL., THE CRISIS IN HEALTH CARE: COST, CHOICES AND
STRATEGIES 5 (1991).
90. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, REPORT TO CONGRESS 16, 104th Cong. (1995) (source: Health Care
Financing Administration, Office of The Actuary, and the Congressional Budget Office for
Projections).
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Total Spending Per Capita
(In Billions) Spending
Year Nominal Real Nominal Real
1980 $251.10 $452.70 $1,068.00 $1,926.00
1985 $431.50 $599.30 $1,761.00 $2,428.00
1990 $696.60 $790.90 $2,684.00 $3,048.00
1991 $755.60 $822.60 $2,880.00 $3,136.00
1992 $820.30 $867.10 $3,094.00 $3,271.00
1993 $884.20 $907.40 $3,301.00 $3,388.00
1994* $940.80 $940.80 $3,478.00 $3,478.00
1995* $1,007.70 $977.40 $3,690.00 $3,579.00
*Projections.
E. The Shift Toward Cost Containment
In response to increasing costs on all fronts, regulatory steps were taken
in the early 1970's and onward in an attempt to reduce health care
expenditures.9' Although there have been numerous enactments affecting
health care at both the state and federal level over the last 25 years, three
developments have had a significant impact on the reshaping of health care
delivery and the ultimate injection of managed care cost containment
mechanisms into the provider-patient relationship.
Of the three significant developments in health care delivery, two were
enacted by Congress in the 1970's. First, in 1972 Congress enacted the
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs), later restructured as
Peer Review Organizations.92 This program introduced into the Medicare
91. RANDALL, supra note 16, at 4, 20.
92. RANDALL, supra note 16, at 27-28. The purpose of the PSRO's as indicated by
Congress was to assure, through the application of suitable procedures of professional standards
review, that the services for which payment could be made would conform to appropriate
professional standards for the provision of health care and that payment for such services would
be made (i) only when, and to the extent medically necessary, as determined in the exercise of
reasonable limits of professional discretion; and, (ii) in the case of services provided by a
hospital or other health care facility on an inpatient basis, only when and for such period as such
services could not, consistent with professionally recognized health care standards, effectively
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system oversight in the form of quality and utilization review.93  Next,
Congress in 1973 passed the Health Maintenance Organization Act.94 Finally,
adding to Congressional efforts, the private sector actively promoted health
care cost containment initiatives.
95
III. PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATIONS AND UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT
As a result of a rising concern that physicians and hospitals in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs were over utilizing services, PSROs were
implemented to look over the shoulders of physicians in order to determine
whether the suggested course of treatment for the patient was adequate and
medically necessary. 9' This system existed in one form or another well before
the introduction of PSROs. Beginning with Medicare's introduction in 1965,
hospitals receiving Medicare reimbursement were required to establish review
panels for the purpose of monitoring quality and appropriateness of care.97
Also, indemnity insurance plans had for the most part conducted retrospective
review upon receipt of claims from providers for payment.98
Those who supported PSRO's and their peer review process believed that
an analysis of records and other information would detect those physicians who
over utilized procedures, resulting in a decrease in health care costs over time.99
However, as in the past, some in the medical field saw a threat to autonomy
and third-party interference in the provider-patient relationship. In 1975 the
implementation of PSROs was challenged in court by providers. However, a
federal district court in Illinois denied the Association of American Physicians
and Surgeons' (Association) claims challenging the legality of PSROs, using
be provided on an out-patient basis or more economically in an in-patient health care facility
of a different type, as determined in the exercise of reasonable limits of professional discretion.
RANDALL, supra note 16, at 27-28.
93. Other important factors leading to the shift toward managed care were (1) the move
from retrospective cost reimbursement for hospitals to the prospective payment system (phased
in beginning in 1983) and (2) physician reimbursement from customary, prevailing, and
reasonable fees to fee schedules based on the resource based relative value scales (phased in
beginning in 1992). These modifications in reimbursement resulted in a decrease in the amount
of reimbursement received for Medicare related care. As a result, providers increasingly shifted
costs to non-Medicare patients resulting in increased expenditures for private payers. See,
MUELLER, supra note 62, at 86.
94. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300aaa (1991).
95. SALMON, supra note 31, at 55-77.
96. LEYERLE, supra note 1, at 52-53.
97. DAVIS, supra note 53, at 21 (noting that Blue Cross had well established utilization
review programs).
98. Michael A. Dowell, Avoiding HMO Liabilityfor Utilization Review, 23 U. TOL. L.
REv. 117 (1991).
99. LEYERLE, supra note 1, at 52-53.
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language that would seem to approve today's cost containment systems.
Interestingly, the Association argued that PSROs were improper for the
following reasons: (i) peer review violated a physician's right to practice
medicine; (ii) interfered with the physician's obligation to independently
exercise skill and judgment; and, (iii) interfered with the physician-patient
relationship, and invaded the patients right to privacy.'l°
In denying all of the Association's claims, the district court determined
that PSRO standards did not prevent the physician from performing his or her
duties and exercising professional skill and judgment. Rather, the standards
merely indicated that if the physician wanted to be paid for services rendered,
compliance with Medicare program standards and guidelines was necessary. 10'
Importantly, the court held that such compliance did not constitute economic
coercion and was appropriate.'0 2
Their validity affirmed, PSROs were given the task of isolating cases
where it appeared that services rendered were unnecessary or could have been
performed more efficiently in an out-patient setting. This responsibility was
later expanded to cover cases where the services provided were considered to
be unacceptable medical practice.'0 3 Unfortunately, the original PSROs created
by Congress were cumbersome and inefficient. As a result, in 1982 Congress
repealed the original PSRO legislation, and in its place it created Peer Review
Organizations (PROs).' °  The PROs differed from PSROs in that private
groups were awarded contracts to perform peer review for government
100. See Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 130-
31 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affid mem. sub nom., Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v.
Matthews, 423 U.S. 975 (1975).
101. Id. at 128-29. In examining the rising cost of the Medicare programs the Senate
Committee on Finance stated:
The Committee on Finance has, for several years, focused its attention on methods
of assuring proper utilization of these services. That utilization controls are
particularly important was extensively revealed in hearings conducted by the
subcommittee on medicare and medicaid. Witnesses testified that a significant
proportion of the health services provided under medicare and medicaid are
probably not medically necessary. In view of the per diem costs of hospital and
nursing facility care, and the costs of medical and surgical procedures, the economic
impact of this overutilization becomes extremely significant. Aside from the
economic impact, the committee is most concerned about the effect of
overutilization on the health of the aged and the poor. Unnecessary hospitalization
and unnecessary surgery are not consistent with proper health care.
Id. (quoting Sen. R. No. 92-1230, 92d Cong. § 254 (1972)).
102. Id. at 134.
103. LEYERLE, supra note 1, at 52-53.
104. LEYERLE, supra note 1, at 54. The PROs originally covered fifty-four areas, a sub-
tantial reduction from the one hundred and ninety five areas covered by the PSROs. Today there
are forty-two PRO's which cover fifty-three PRO areas. See, FuRRow, supra note 50, at 86-87.
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sponsored health programs.' °5 PROs, while performing functions similar to
those of the PSROs, were given many other responsibilities, such as ferreting
out improper care for appropriate sanction." 6 In part, the PROs suffered from
the same deficiencies that the PSROs exhibited: costs incurred in attempting
to reduce utilization at times exceeded any potential savings. Part of the
problem from an administrative cost standpoint, which payers in the health care
system constantly battled, was the PROs attempts to transfer their costs to the
provider. For example, PROs, as part of their review function, directed
providers to copy and transport (at the providers' expense) patient records to
PRO offices for review.'0 7 These and other government regulations resulted in
significant costs for providers. These additional costs, like many others, were
shifted to private payers resulting in an adverse impact on employers who
provided significant health care benefits to employees.08
Even with such deficiencies, the potential benefits from PSROs were not
lost on the private sector. In a span of eight years, 25 percent of PSROs had
entered into contracts with private entities to provided utilization review
services.'O' Positive results from private sector utilization review programs
fueled their growth. For example, by the late 1970's John Deere & Company
reported that its utilization review program resulted in a 30% decrease in
employee hospital days. General Motors reported a reduction in costs of over
$2 billion."0 Between 1982 through 1985, 27% of companies had injected
utilization review into their employee health plans. By 1989, one survey
indicated that approximately 125 utilization review companies provided
services to organizations with as few as ten thousand individuals to as many as
eleven million."' Today, approximately nine out of ten employers have some
form of peer and utilization review mechanisms in their health plans. 2
Over the last 25 years, the peer review and utilization monitoring has
evolved into the industry of utilization management (UM or "utilization
review"), a critical link in the cost containment process." 3 Today UM is
105. LEYERLE, supra note 1, at 54.
106. LEYERLE, supra note 1, at 72.
107. LEYERLE, supra note 1, at 90-91.
108. LEYERIE, supra note 1, at 89-90. The PROs attempts to shift these costs to providers
was ultimately found to be in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Burlington
Memorial Hosp. v. Bowen, 644 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wis. 1986).
109. LEYERLE, supra note 1, at 70-71.
110. BRADFORD H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE 299-300 (1991).
111. Id. at261.
112. CHARLES G. BENDA & FAY A. RozovsKY, MANAGED CARE AND THE LAW § 1.4
(1996).
113. Mary R. Kohler, When the Whole Exceeds the Sum of its Parts: Why Existing
Utilization Management Practices Don't Measure Up, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 1061, 1062-63
(1992).
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conducted by insurance companies, third party administrators, managed care
entities, and private companies that provide specialized UM services." 4 UM
in these areas involves a myriad of functions. Techniques include monitoring
the practice patterns of providers," 5 case management of high cost cases,16
referral management," 7 and service and coverage authorization." 8  The
monitoring of provider practice patterns includes the use of medical manage-
ment guidelines to educate providers on quality and efficiency." 9 Information
obtained from historical practice patterns are compared with those of other
providers. 2° This process, known as profiling, is used in part to isolate
inefficient and low quality providers.' 2' Case management of high cost cases
includes high intensity and low intensity programs."2 In high intensity
programs, a great amount of the case manager's time is spent with the
subscriber designing a plan which sets forth the services the subscriber will
receive. 2 ' On the other hand, low intensity programs focus on inpatient use
and authorization. 24 Referral management requires a plan subscriber to obtain
the authorization of a primary care physician (gatekeeper) before seeing a
specialist or scheduling for non-routine examinations or procedures. "5 Finally,
in the service and coverage authorization mode, UM compares services
provided to a patient with established criteria developed from information
obtained from comparable patients in order to determine if proposed, ongoing,
or completed health care services are medically necessary. 26
Prospective UM occurs when a decision is rendered regarding the
necessity of proposed care. 27 This process may include pre-admission review
for emergency room care, hospitalization, second opinions for surgeries, and
review by the subscriber's primary care physician. When a patient is receiving
treatment, concurrent UM may occur in order to determine if the plan of
treatment is appropriate, and if not appropriate, advise the provider and patient
114. GRAY, supra note 110, at 275.
115. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 81.
116. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 81.
117. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 80.
118. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 80.
119. See Michael Daly, Attacking Defensive Medicine Through the Utilization of Practice
Parameters, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 101, 106-08 (1995).
120. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 81.
121. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 81.
122. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 81.
123. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 81.
124. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 80-8 1.
125. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 80-81.
126. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 80-81.
127. Cheralyn E. Schessler, Liability Implications of Utilization Review as a Cost
Containment Mechanism, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 383 (1992).
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that payment for the care will not be authorized.12 Finally, the more
traditional, and probably least effective UM method from a cost savings
standpoint, is retrospective review, a process that occurs after the services have
already been performed. 2 9  UM services can be performed by payers,
providers, or by UM entities that directly contract with the payer or provider.
1 30
The UM process that has generated the most interest occurs at the prospective
level. The goal of pre-authorization programs is to avoid expenditures on
unnecessary care and provide cost efficient alternatives such as out-patient
services.
Logistically, the UM process entails a review of the subscriber's case,
usually by a registered nurse, who analyzes the care or plocedures proposed or
provided in order to determine whether they fall within the managed care
entity's utilization standards. After this initial analysis has been completed and
it has been determined that the treatment is not within the standards, the case
is presented to a UM physician or medical director for further analysis. If, after
consultation with the subscriber's physician, it is determined that the care is not
medically necessary, payment will not be authorized.' In the event it is
determined that the requested service is not medically necessary and thus not
covered under the policy, the subscriber can elect to pay for the service out of
pocket or pursue an appeal of the decision. 1
32
The standards relied upon by the reviewing nurse or physician in making
a determination have in many instances been developed from previous studies
conducted by managed care organizations, medical associations, government
agencies, and insurance and UM companies. Sources relied upon in UM
include the Appropriateness Evaluation Protocol, Intensity of Service, Severity
of Illness, Discharge and Appropriateness Screening Criteria, and the
Standardized Medreview Instrument. These standards evolved from programs
funded by the government to develop criteria for the PSRO's. In addition,
databases have been developed commercially for use in the UM process. Such
systems include programs developed by the Health Data Institute, Medi Qual
Systems, Inc. and SysteMetrics.'33
The standards utilized in making UM decisions include, but are not
limited to, the following: itemized listing of procedures that will not be
approved due to a lack of medical necessity or are simply not covered by the
health plan; whether the procedure is more appropriate in an out-patient setting;
128. RANDALL, supra note 16, at 27-29.
129. See DOWELL, supra note 98, at 117.
130. RANDALL, supra note 16, at 28.
131. DOWELL, supra note 98, at 118.
132. GRAY, supra note 110, at 288.
133. GRAY, supra note 110, at 291-93.
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specific criteria which justify exceptions to established standards due to a
subscriber's medical history or other factors; standards which require a second
opinion or which indicate that a second opinion is not necessary; factors which
address issues relating to hospital admission or reduction in additional days
requested by provider; and, standards for evaluating proposed medical
procedures. 1
34
Although the specific standards employed by UM organizations may
differ, the standards that have been developed (and are continually revised) are
the result of significant study and agreement among professionals and
organizations in the health care field.'35 These standards are also beginning to
be utilized as a yardstick to measure efficient practitioners and create
consistency in patient care.
136
Today, those employed in UM are active in organizations that have been
involved in the development of suggested standards and criteria to be
implemented in day-to-day UM activities. One of the main organizations
involved in development of accreditation standards for UM organizations is the
Utilization Review Accreditation Commission (URAC)' 37 URAC, along with
groups such as the American Medical Peer Review Association, Health
Insurance Association of America, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association
have developed standards and criteria which include the following: (i) UM
standards and criteria based upon information provided by medical profession-
als; (ii) provider and payer awareness of UM standards and criteria; (iii) UM
decisions provided within 48 hours; (iv) no delay in admission for emergency
cases; (v) appropriately trained reviewers and physicians who are utilized when
procedure approval is denied; (vi) taking actions to contact the attending
physician prior to procedure denial; (vii) providing written notice of procedure
denial to the subscriber, physician and care facility within 48 hours, after initial
verbal contact; (viii) patient confidentiality protection; and, (ix) appropriate
review process for adverse decisions. 1
38
In addition to the guidelines above, many states have enacted laws
regulating individuals and entities providing utilization management services.
The state of Florida for example requires an appropriate registration application
134. GRAY, supra note 110, at 290.
135. See GRAY, supra note 110, at 296-97.
136. For an excellent in depth discussion, see NATIONAL HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
THE COLLOQUIUM REPORT ON LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES
(1995).
137. See Outside Accreditation of Managed Care Plans, THE MANAGED CARE HANDBOOK
237-40 (2d ed. 1993).
138. DOWELL, supra note 98, at 126 (Guidelines for Health Benefits Administration
Concurrent Review and General Administrative Procedures (1990)).
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which details policies and procedures, the names of qualified personnel and the
appeal process.'39
IV. HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION ACT OF 1973 AND RISK
SHIFTING THROUGH INCENTIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS
Private enterprise recognized early that utilization review in the format
developed by the government, although having potential benefits, could only
be successful if implemented in conjunction with the other cost containment
mechanisms such as increased patient cost sharing, employee wellness
programs, and delivery systems such as health maintenance organizations.' 0
Thus, one of the other links in the cost containment chain, financial risk
shifting, has slowly evolved as a result of Congress's actions in breathing new
life into the "health maintenance strategy" with the enactment of the Health
Maintenance Organization Act in 1973 (the HIMO Act).' 4' The term "Health
Maintenance Organization" (HMO) was first used by Dr. Paul M. Ellwood in
the early 1970's in an effort to garner support for health care delivery systems
which were efficient and not based upon the long existing fee-for-service
system.1
42
The uniqueness of HMOs was that they not only financed health care, but
participated in the delivery of health care to their subscribers as well. The early
HMOs delivered health care services through an employed physician staff,
similar to the system implemented by the GHA in the late 1930's discussed
above. HMO subscribers received a pre-determined set of benefits from staff
physicians.
43
Interestingly, the HMO Act came about as a result of significant corporate
support in response to rising health care costs for employee health care
139. See FLA. STAT. ch. 395.002(29) (1995) defining utilization review as "a system for
reviewing the medical necessity or appropriateness in the allocation of health care resources of
hospital services given or proposed to be given to a patient or group of patients." Id.
140. See DAVIS, supra note 53, at 125. The UM industry has even recognized that UM
alone cannot solve the problem of rising health care costs. The Institute of Medicine's
Committee on Utilization Management has indicated that, although UM has helped reduce
inpatient hospital stays, it has not changed increases in overall health care costs. See GRAY,
supra note 110, at 302.
141. Health Maintenance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (1973). In 1972,
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners drafted model legislation for state
sponsored HMOs. Since 1972, many states have enacted HMO legislation.
142. Salmon, supra note 31, at 85; see also Paul Ellwood, Health Maintenance
Organizations: Concept and Strategy, HoSPrrALS, March 16, 1971, at 53.
143. McGraw, supra note 71, at 1823.
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benefits.144 Corporate concern however did not come about overnight. During
the preceding decade the "class conscious corporate directorate" became
increasingly involved with health care issues, 14 as the influence of long-
standing health care interests diminished.'4 As 1970 arrived, corporate support
of the IIMO Act was bolstered by Ellwood, who emphasized the potential
savings that could result from using HMOs. 147
The original HMO legislation provided for federal grants to establish
private HMOs and included criteria for the types of benefits which were to be
provided to enrollees. 48 The Act also set forth the requisite standards for
federally qualified HMOs and preempted state laws, which as previously
mentioned, made it difficult to implement ACCS's. From 1973 to 1983 over
$350 million in grants and loans were provided by the government to establish
HMOs around the country. 14 9  Although funding stopped in 1981, the
government has continued to follow a policy of promoting the development of
HMOs by fostering private competition and authorizing Medicare and
Medicaid enrollment.' 5  Since the early 1970's, subscribership in HMOs has
gone from roughly 3.6 million'15 to a projected 65 million in 1996. 152 The
following diagram (in millions) shows just how rapidly America is moving
toward managed care arrangements and away from traditional health care
delivery:
144. Salmon, supra note 31, at 86-87.
145. Salmon, supra note 31, at 85.
146. Salmon, supra note 31, at 85 (including the American Medical Association, American
Hospital Association, American Public Health Association, and the Association of American
Medical Colleges).
147. Salmon, supra note 31, at 87. A recent editorial by Dr. Ellwood addressing the state
of the American Health System and steps which will be taken in the next phase of the managed
care phenomenon can be found at Paul Ellwood, Managed Care: A Work In Progress, 276
JAMA 13, Oct. 2, 1996, at 1083-86.
148. DAVIS ETAL., supra note 53, at 134-35.
149. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 53, at 135.
150. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 53, at 135. During the first part of 1994, 5.1% of Medicare
beneficiaries and 17.2% of Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in managed care plans.
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, supra note 90, at 136. These numbers have
continued to increase. It is now estimated that nearly 4 million Medicaid recipients are enrolled
in managed care plans. HMO, supra note 31, at 62.
151. McGraw, supra note 71, at 1823.
152. Julie Johnson, HMOs Dominate, Shape the Market, 39 AMERiCAN MEDICAL NEWS,
Jan. 22-29, 1996, at 1, 7.

















The risk shifting mechanisms utilized by IMOs and other managed care
organizations, were eloquently described by Judge Posner recently in the
Marshfield Clinic case when he wrote the following:
The risk shifting feature of the concept lies in the fact that if the subscriber
incurs above-average medical expenses, the excess cost is bome by the
HMO rather than by the subscriber (or by his insurer, or more likely by
both because of co-payment and deductible provisions in the insurance
policy), while if he incurs below-average medical expense the difference
enures to the benefit of the IMO rather than to him or his insurer (or,
again, both). To control the upside risk that it incurs, the HMO provides
medical services through physicians with whom it has contracts specifying
their compensation, rather than merely reimbursing some percentage of
whatever fee they might happen to charge for their services."'
Risk shifting mechanisms in the form of financial incentive arrangements
with health care providers utilized by HMO's and other managed care vehicles
come in various shapes and sizes. However, the most recognized financial
arrangements include managed fee-for-service, capitation, and financial
incentive arrangements.155 Under the managed fee-for-service arrangement,
154. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic & Sec. Health Plan, Inc., 65
F.3d 1406, 1409 (7th Cir. 1995).
155. HOWARD S. ROWLAND & BEATRICE L. ROWLAND, HOSPITAL LEGAL FORMS
CHECKLISTS, & GUIDELINES 39:29-39:32 (1986).
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discounts are applied to the usual and customary charges or discounted fee
schedules are utilized. 5 6  Capitation arrangements usually reimburse the
provider with a specific payment for each subscriber on a monthly basis.'
This payment method acts to shift a portion of risk to the provider. Under a
capitation arrangement, the provider incurs a service risk as well as a potential
financial risk. In terms of the service risk, the physician is obligated to provide
his time to the patient, whether it be one visit or numerous visits to the
provider's office. With respect to financial risk, the provider faces exposure
if he or she has a panel of patients that require higher levels of care.'58 Under
the managed fee-for-service or capitation arrangement, a percentage of the total
amounts which are to be paid to the providers are withheld for later distribu-
tion, if certain performance goals are met.'59 Finally, risk based financial
incentive arrangements include designated funds which are set aside for
disbursement at the conclusion of the year. These designated funds or "risk
pools" are allocated based upon whether certain goals or projections have been
met by the provider or group. Performance goals are established for separate
risk pools that can encompass hospital referrals, emergency room referrals,
consultative (specialist) services, and quality assurance pools.' 6' In a recent
survey, risk sharing with providers was prevalent in HMO's, but not in PPO's,
which primarily used a fee-for-service payment arrangement. Interestingly, of
the 108 managed care organizations responding to the survey, fifty percent of
the staff or group model HMO's and seventy-four percent of the network or
independent practice association model H1MO's calculated payments to
providers based upon utilization and cost patterns.' 6' The following diagram
shows the various types of financial arrangements between physicians and
managed care entities:' 62
156. Id. at 39:29. Other managed fee-for-service arrangements include the following: (i)
global fees which are in the nature of a single payment for a designated procedure; (ii) global
fees with specific outcomes which pay a single fee for a designated procedure including
additional care relating to the initial procedure; and (iii) target expenditures which include a
sum of money designated for provider service. Id.
157. Id. at 39:30. For an excellent discussion of the various models of capitation, see
Thomas S. Bodenheimer, M.D., M.P.H. et al., Capitation or Decapitation: Keeping Your Head
in Changing Times, 276 JAMA 13, Oct. 2, 1996, at 1025-31.
158. ROWLAND&ROwLAND,supra note 155, at 39:30.
159. ROWLAND & ROWLAND, supra note 155, at 39:32.
160. ROWLAND & ROWLAND, supra note 155, at 39:31.
161. Marsha R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed Care Plans
Make with Physicians, 333 N. ENG. J. MED. 1678, 1680-81 (1995).
162. RowLAND & ROwLAND, supra note 155, at 39:29, 37:5. Hospital and HMO payment





Traditional Target Fee for service Individual
fee for service expendibres with group and group
capitation c pitation
Global IndiMdual Fee for setice Individual
fern capitaon with group and capitation
with fee for capitation
service guarantees hospital
Risk Based Payments
QA UM Traditional Referral Combination
bonus bonus withhold pool risk fund pool
QA and UM No Ancillary Hospitalization
bonus withhold pool risk pool
The government's pro-competitive policy, private sector efforts, and
innovations in the implementation of ACCS's have started to bear fruit. These
systems bring together the two critical elements for cost efficient health care:
finance and delivery. By combining these two elements, a bridge has been
built across the gulf that once existed between the provider and payer. As a
result, the provider must not only provide care but must also act as a cost
efficient manager with respect to the care provided. Taking on this new
responsibility, the provider becomes a player, rather than spectator, in this
nation's effort to control health care costs. Recent reports have indicated that
spiraling costs have begun to level off and employer paid premiums for health
care have in many instances decreased.63
163. INTERNAL MEDICINE NEWS, vol. 29, no. 4, Feb. 15, 1996, at 1 (citing KPMG Peat
Marwick national survey of 1,037 employers with at least 200 or more employees). In 1995
HMO premiums increased just 0.4% compared with a 9.8% increase in 1992. PPOs and POSs
-have experienced similar slowdowns in premium increases. On the whole, 1995 saw a 2.1%
increase compared with a 10.9% increase in 1992. Id.
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V. MANAGED CARE MODELS: IMOS, PPOs, PHOs AND IDSs
As indicated above, ]HMO's are unique in that they not only finance health
care but also participate in its delivery. Although the differing managed care
models will be discussed in detail below, these vehicles share some of the same
operational characteristics, including the following: (i) subscribers (employer
or individual) submit fixed premiums to the HMO or managed care organiza-
tion ("MCO"); (ii) subscribers receive a pre-determined menu of benefits from
only authorized providers identified by the HMO; (iii) other than in instances
where a small co-payment is required, subscribers are not normally billed for
services provided by lIMO authorized providers; (iv) utilization management,
subscriber relations, marketing and other operational functions are the
responsibility of the HMO entity; and, (v) the HMO is responsible for
appropriate selection of providers, regardless of the applicable model."6 The
following diagram shows the distinctions between the traditional fee-for-




164. James P. Freiburg, The ABCs ofMCOs: An Overview ofManaged Care Organizations,
81 ILL. B.J. 584, 585-86 (1993).
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Because HMOs participate in the financing of health care delivery, they
are subject to government regulation. The HMO Act of 1973 and subsequent
amendments regulate federally qualified HMO's, while at the same time many
states 166 have enacted similar laws and regulations. 67
There are several well recognized HMO models. These include the staff
model, group/network model and independent practice association ("AIP')
model. In addition, models such as the preferred provider organization and
physician-hospital organization unlike HMOs, are not involved in the financing
of delivery but rather contract with payers to provide health care services at
discounted rates.
A. Staff Model
In the staff model, providers are full-time salaried employees who provide
services exclusively to subscribers of the HMO. In addition, clinical,
laboratory, and imaging facilities, where subscribers receive health care
166. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 309 (1995). Generally, the states which have
HMO legislation regulate both delivery and insurance issues.
167. FLA. STAT. ch. 641 (1995), referred to as the "Heath Maintenance Organization Act,"
addresses a wide array of areas, including certification requirements, surplus requirements,
member and provider contract language requirements, and annual reporting requirements. Id.
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B. Group and Network Model
In the group model, the providers rather than being employees of the
HMO are associated with a physician group practice. Depending on the
circumstances, the group may have been established well before entering into
an arrangement with the HMO or may have been created in order to compete
for IMO provider agreements. 70 In most instances, the HMO will pay the
group practice on a capitated basis. When payment is capitated, the HMO
reimburses the group practice on an agreed upon fixed payment per-patient,
despite the nature or intensity of service provided.' 71 The group practice will
usually have various methods for reimbursing its providers including fixed
salary, reduced fee-for-service, or capitation. 172 The group model is depicted
in the following diagram: 173
168. How To FIND THE BEST DocToRs, HOSPITALS AND HMOs 177 (1995).
169. THOMAS C. FOX ET AL., Health Care Financial Transactions Manual, ch. 11, at 11-6
(1995).
170. BENDA & ROZOVSKY, supra note 112, at 2-11. The group may have been created by
the HMO in order to provide health care services to the HMO's subscribers. BENDA &
ROZOVSKY, supra note 112, at 2-11.
171. R. FINKELSTEin ET AL., supra note 153, at 79.
172. BENDA& RozovsKY, supra note 112, at 2-11.









A hybrid of the group model is the network model. In this model, the
IHMO contracts with numerous groups in order to provide its subscribers with
services which they require. An IMO would turn to the network model in
situations where groups providing specialization services are not available in





It should be noted that under any of the above arrangements, the HMO
can offer to its subscribers a point-of-service option. If such an option is
provided, subscribers are not required to first see their primary care physician
174. BENDA & ROZOVSKY, supra note 112, at 2-11 to 2-12. Group and staff model HMOs
have closed panels in that the physicians are permitted to provide service exclusively to
subscribers, but only if the provider is employed by the HMO or associated with the group that
has an agreement with the HMO. A network model on the other hand can be an open or closed
panel. BENDA & ROzOvSKY, supra note 112, at 2-12.
175. FOX ET AL., supra note 169, at 11-6.
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but instead may opt to go "out of network" in return for paying a higher
deductible or co-payment. 76
C. Independent Practice Association Model
Under the IPA model, individual providers contract with a separate entity
called an IPA, an organization that then enters into agreements with various
HMOs and other third party payers. The providers continue to practice out of
their offices and are paid by the IPA on a capitated or discounted fee-for-
service basis.'77 IPAs originated in the 1970's to provide individual practitio-
ners a vehicle within which to compete with pre-paid group practice plans. 78




I I I I F -1Individual Physician
Contracts
D. Preferred Provider and Physician-Hospital Organization Models
Under the PPO model, providers contract with the PPO and agree to
provide health care services at reduced fee-for-service rates. Subscribers under
contract with the PPO receive discounted rates when utilizing providers in the
network. A critical component for obtaining reduced costs under the PPO
176. BENDA & RozovsKY, supra note 112, at 2-14. Point-of-service options are also
available under the preferred provider model. BENDA & RozovsKy, supra note 112, at 2-14.
177. BENDA & RozovsKy, supra note 112, at 2-12. An IPA model normally operates on
an open panel basis, allowing the provider to provide services to individuals who are not
subscribers of the HMO. BENDA & ROZOVSKY, supra note 112, at 2-12.
178. GRAY, supra note 110, at 217.
179. FOXETAL.,supra note 169, at 11-6.1.
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model is the proper selection of efficient providers.'8° The various PPO models








180. GRAY, supra note 110, at 217-18.
181. FOXETAL.,supra note 169, at 11-8, 11-9, 11-10.
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The PHO is a relatively new managed health care vehicle. A PHO is an
arrangement between a group of physicians and a hospital, the purpose of
which is to attract payer contracts from health insurers, employers, and HMOs.
The PHO is structured as a for-profit corporation and operates in a fashion
similar to a PPO or IPA.'82 The PHO model is depicted in the following
diagram:...
182. BENDA & ROzOvsKY, supra note 112, at 2-14.




Although other managed care models similar to the ones described above
may use different acronyms, cost containment principles shared among them
are similar. These principles include the following: (i) providers employed by
or under arrangements with a managed care organization provide medical
services at reduced rates to the managed care organization subscribers who,
depending on the plan, pay higher deductibles or co-payments when going out
of network; (ii) cost containment mechanisms such as utilization management
and profiling are implemented; and, (iii) risk shifting arrangements between the
managed care organization and its providers insure cost efficient care.""
E. Integrated Delivery Systems
The managed care models outlined above are in many instances
incorporated into cost containment strategies which include integrated delivery
systems ("IDS"). Although, IDSs continue to evolve, these systems essentially
attempt to bring together hospital and physician functions that have tradition-
ally remained separate on administrative and structural levels. IDSs represent
the effort by hospitals and physicians to combine resources for efficiency and
to compete with other managed care entities.
184. Freiburg, supra note 164, at 585.
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The foundation, hospital-controlled, joint-venture and medical-service
organization represent the most recognized IDS models in the health care
industry.
1. Foundation Model
In part, the foundation model has been developed in order to avoid
potential problems created by the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.' 5
Under the foundation model, a hospital creates a foundation which can be a
for-profit or not-for-profit corporation. The foundation thereafter acquires the
stock or assets of a physician practice. The physicians are employed by the
hospital or enter into employment agreements with the foundation. In
jurisdictions which continue to adhere to the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine, the stock of the professional corporation will usually be controlled by
a physician who is an administrative employee of the hospital. Pursuant to this
arrangement, this physician is contractually obligated to transfer the stock of
the professional corporation upon the occurrence of certain events spelled out
in a stock transfer restriction agreement. An example of the foundation model






185. Fox ETAL., supra note 169, at 11-26. The corporate practice of medicine doctrine is
discussed in depth in Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 664 N.E.2d 337 (Ill. App. Ct.
4th 1996). It should be noted that only a few states vigorously continue to enforce the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine (ex. California and Texas). In Florida, the Board of Medicine has
held that there is no prohibition on the practice of medicine by physicians as corporate
employees. See In re: Petition for Declaratory Statements of Conrad Goulet, M.D., 15 FLAR
4184 (1989); Petition for Declaratory Statements of John W. Lister, M.D., 9 FLAR 6299
(1977).




In the hospital-controlled model, a hospital will employ providers directly
to provide health care services. Alternatively, the hospital may create a
separate entity for purposes of operating an out-patient clinic. The clinic then
employs providers or, alternatively, enters into other arrangements with
providers for services to clinic patients. An example of the hospital-controlled
model is depicted in the following diagram:' 87
3. Joint Venture Model
In the joint venture model, a corporation, general partnership, limited
partnership, or limited liability company is formed between a hospital and a
number of physicians in order to create a business arrangement which can
include anything from an HMO to an out-patient surgery center. These
arrangements can be very complicated and often implicate a wide array of legal
187. FOX ET AL., supra note 169, at 11-27.
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issues that can include tax, securities, anti-trust, referral, and anti-kickback
statutes. An example of the joint-venture corporate model is depicted in the
following diagram:. 8
4. Management and Medical Services Organization
A management services organization ("MSO") is a legally distinct entity
created by a hospital or a joint venture between a hospital and a group of
physicians. An MSO provides administrative services such as purchasing to
physicians, physician groups, and hospitals. An entity that provides services
188. ROWLAND &ROWLAND ET AL., supra note 155, at 35:11.
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exclusively to physicians and physician groups is known as a medical services
organization. An example of ajoint venture management services organization




SSupport !  ManagementServices
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Many of the systems described above have implemented numerous cost
containment measures, including UM and financial incentive arrangements
between health care providers and payers. In one survey, 95 percent of the 108
managed care organizations responding implemented some form of UM, while
69 percent offered some form of risk sharing or financial incentives to their
* providers.' 09 The potential liability issues arising from these two types of cost
containment mechanisms will be discussed in the next section.
VI. EMERGING UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT LIABILITY CLAIMS
Managed care and competition, like other new systems or products
introduced into the stream of commerce, are now beginning to face many
rapids. These rapids, in the form of lawsuits, will test the staying power of UM
and the widespread commitment to cost containment.
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, some of these lawsuits have
caught the eye of the media, resulting in articles which have been less than
flattering about the managed care system. For instance, stories in prominent
189. INTEGATED HEALTHcARE DELIVERY SYsTEMs MANUAL, supra note 183, § 410, at
6.
190. Gold et al., supra note 161, at 1681-82.
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publications have questioned UJM decisions that deny payment for proposed
treatment and alternative financial arrangements between managed care
companies and providers.' 91 One article even contained a list of things that
HMO's allegedly failed to tell their subscribers. 92 Two of the items on the list
concerned UM and financial incentives. Specifically, with respect to UM, the
article stated that an HMO's rule of thumb for its subscribers is that "you're not
sick until we say you're sick," and on the issue of financial incentive
arrangements between health care providers and payers, the article indicated
that "the less your doctor sees you, the more he earns."' 93 The irony of the
present controversy is that under the so-called traditional system of health care,
increased utilization (whether necessary or not) gave the provider financial
incentive because it increased his or her income. In addition, without the
benefit of practice protocols and UM, one could be treated any of ten different
ways (efficiently or inefficiently) depending on the provider.
Although there have been instances where poor UM decisions have been
made, the information to date does not warrant a complete indictment of the
system as some propose. With respect to financial incentives, there is little
evidence that subscribers have been adversely affected by such programs."9
Importantly, the mere fact that a decision is made, or a program implemented
is under the umbrella of managed care does not ipsofacto make it improper or
raise it to the level of negligent conduct.
Where imprudent decisions are purportedly made, careful analysis of the
specific facts is necessary to determine the proper existence of liability. The
application of general liability principles, and those which have emerged in the
field of health law, must be considered whether one is dealing with an HMO,
PPO, IPA, or one of the IDS models described above. These principles include
individual provider liability for malpractice, liability in the context of the
employment relationship under respondeat superior, claims arising from
apparent or ostensible agency theories, corporate negligence, 95 breach of
191. Erik Larson, The Soul of an HMO, TIME, Jan. 22, 1996, at 44-52; Ellyn E. Spragins,
Beware Your HMO, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 1995, at 54-56. See also John E. Wave, Jr., Ph.D.
et al., Differences in Four-Year Health Outcomes for Elderly and Poor, Chronically Il Patients
Treated in HMO and Fee-For-Service Systems, 276 JAMA 13, Oct. 2, 1996, at 1039-47; Richard
C. Reuben, In Pursuit of Health, 82 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 54-60; George Anders, Who Pays
Cost of Cut-Rate Heart Care?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1996, at B 1.
192. John Protos, Ten Things Your HMO Won't Tell You, SMARTMoNEY, Mar. 1996, at
134-44. See also Susan Dentzer, Inside the World of Managed Care, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, April 15, 1996, at 56; Ronald Kotulak & Peter Gorner, Medicine Aches with HMO
Fever, Cli. TRIB., Apr. 14, 1996, § 1, at 1, 16; Carol Jouzaitis, States Crack Down on HMO's
Abuse ofPower, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 15, 1996, § 1, at 1, 13.
193. Protos, supra note 192, at 134.44.
194. McGraw, supra note 71, at 1832.
195. See Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995). In Dunn, the New Jersey Supreme
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contract, breach of warranty, and consumer based claims resulting from unfair
and deceptive practices.'9* In addition, recent Employment Retirement Income
and Security Act (ERISA) cases, which address the impact of preemption on
a plaintiff's ability to pursue liability claims in the managed care arena, will be
explored with respect to UM liability claims. Finally, the steps managed care
entities must take in order to avoid potential liability claims relating to UM and
financial incentive arrangements with health care providers will be considered.
A. The Genesis of UM Liability: Wickline v. State of California and
Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California
The first legal attack against UM came in Wickline v. California.'97 The
issue, as framed by the Wickline court, was whether a third party payer that had
instituted a cost containment program was liable for injuries suffered by a
subscriber as the result of cost containment decisions which adversely affected
the implementation of the treating provider's medical judgment.9" The
relevant facts concerned Medi-Cal's decision to deny a treating physician's
request for an eight-day extension of hospitalization for his patient. Medi-Cal
administered California's Medicaid program.'99
The plaintiff-patient, Lois Wickline, had been treated for Leriche's
Syndrome.2°° The syndrome, which results in an obstruction of the terminal
aorta, can only be treated through surgery.2' 1 The request for an extension
resulted from complications that arose after the surgery. Making the request
for the extension, Ms. Wickline's physician properly filled out and filed the
form required by Medi-Cal.0 2 The information contained on the form was
ultimately reviewed by Medi-Cal's "on-site nurse" and later by a physician
who acted as a Medi-Cal consultant.0 3 Ultimately, the consultant, Dr.
Glassman, authorized only a four-day extension based on the information on
Court indicated that HMOs could be held liable under the doctrine of corporate negligence for
acts arising from negligent selection and control of physicians, and for the corporation's
independent acts of negligence such as management of utilization control systems. The court
also indicated that the negligent physician could potentially assert a third party claim against
an HMO. Id.
196. See Torin A. Dorros & T. Howard Stone, Implications of Negligent Selection and
Retention of Physicians in the Age of ERISA, 21 AM. J. L. & MED. 383 (1995).
197. 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
198. Id. at 661.
199. Id. at 664-65.
200. Id. at 663.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 664.
203. Id. at 664-65.
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the form.2" Dr. Glassman did not review any of Ms. Wickline's medical
records or other information. As a result of Medi-Cal's decision denying the
requested extension, Ms. Wickline's physician discharged her without making
any appeal on her behalf.20 5 Shortly after discharge, Ms. Wickline began to
suffer severe discomfort and consequently was readmitted nine days later.2" 6
As a result of the complications which developed while she was at home,
it became necessary to amputate her leg. 07 Ms. Wickline filed suit against
Medi-Cal for its consultant's negligence in discontinuing her stay in the
hospital.208 Ms. Wickline prevailed at trial.209 On appeal, the verdict was
reversed.210 In its decision, the court acknowledged that the case appeared to
be the first where a negligence claim had been asserted against a third-party
payer for what was in essence a medical malpractice claim.21' In rejecting Ms.
Wickline's argument, the court found that Medi-Cal had not overridden her
treating physician's medical judgment.212 Rather, as a payer of medical care,
Medi-Cal had implemented its responsibilities under a prospective utilization
review program.21 3 Acknowledging the significant impact such programs can
have on cost savings as well as patient care, the court carefully reviewed the
relevant law. Since Medi-Cal was not a party to the treating physician's
decision to discharge Ms. Wickline, the court reasoned it could not be "held to
share" in the harm which resulted.2 4 The court indicated that, although it
recognized that cost containment programs had become a part of the health care
system, such systems should not corrupt the judgment of medical
professionals. 215 The court further stated that third party payers of health care
services can be held liable and legally accountable when medically inappropri-
ate decisions result from defects in the design or implementation of cost
containment mechanisms. 216 The only example provided by the court was
based on issues in the case relating to the decision making process.217
204. Id. at 665-66.
205. Id. at 666.
206. Id. at 667.
207. Id. at 668.




212. Id. at 670-71.
213. Id.
214. Id. The court acknowledged that the decision by Medi-Cal's consultant was in
compliance with existing law in California regulating Medi-Cal, and that the principal treating
physician did not utilize a reconsideration procedure within the Medi-Cal funding process to
seek an extension of benefits for further hospitalization. Id.
215. Id. at 672.
216. Id. at 670-71.
217. Id. at 670-71. The court stated that liability may result where appeals made on a
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The courts in California revisited the subject of UM liability in 1990. The
decision in Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California broadly recognized
UM liability.218 Like Wickline, the Wilson case arose out of a UM decision
which determined that no further payment would be forthcoming for any
additional hospitalization. Unlike Wickline, in Wilson the health care coverage
in question was a private, rather than publicly funded benefit plan.219
The strange twist of facts which lead to the ultimate decision in Wilson
began on March 1, 1983, when Howard Wilson, Jr., checked himself into the
College Hospital in Los Angeles, California. He was complaining of
depression, drug addiction, and anorexia. 220 At the time, Mr. Wilson's health
care benefits were covered under a policy issued by Alabama Blue Cross. 22'
The facts established in the case indicated that California Blue Cross was
obligated to provide the benefits in the insurance policy between Mr. Wilson
and Alabama Blue Cross.2m Approximately ten days after Mr. Wilson checked
into the hospital, he was informed by his attending physician that the carrier
would no longer pay for the hospitalization.223 The attending physician
believed that Mr. Wilson needed three to four weeks of inpatient care. 224 As
a result of the carrier's decision, Mr. Wilson left the hospital; he committed
suicide twenty days later.22
Mr. Wilson's estate asserted claims against Blue Cross of Southern
California, Alabama Blue Cross, and Western Medical Review, which was the
entity under contract to provide UM services to Blue Cross of Southern
patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily ignored, unreasonably disregarded,
or overridden. Id.
218. Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d 1990).
The decision has been cited by commentators for the broad based recognition of UM liability.
See David D. Griner, Note, Paying the Piper: Third Party Payer Liability for Medical
Treatment Decisions, 25 GA. L. REv. 861 (1991).
219. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81.
220. Id. at 877-78, 881-82.
221. Id. at 880-81.
222. Id. at 880. The relevant provisions of the contract stated as follows:
INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICE. While a member is covered under this
Contract and is a registered bed patient in a Hospital, and during such time ... as
the Member's attending Physician determines that hospitalization is necessary, such
Member shall be entitled to the following benefits, herein referred to as Hospital
Service . . . Benefits for Mental and Nervous Disorders or for Pulmonary
Tuberculosis . . . Benefits hereunder for mental and nervous disorders or for
pulmonary tuberculosis shall be limited to an aggregate of thirty (30) days during
any period of twelve (12) consecutive months.
Id.
223. Id. at 877-78.
224. Id. at 877, 881-82.
225. Id. at 878.
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California.' Mr. Wilson's estate also sued Dr. John Wasserman, who was an
employee of Western Medical Review.227 It is critical to note that the claims
asserted by the estate were based upon tortious breach of an insurance contract,
inducing a breach of an insurance contract and wrongful death.22' The case was
reviewed by the appellate court after the trial court had granted the defendants'
motions for summary judgment. 229 The lower court, granting the relief
requested by the defendants, relied on Wickline and determined that the
decision to discharge was the attending physician's responsibility and not the
defendants'.230
Oddly enough, on review the court of appeals distanced itself from its
prior decision in Wickline. In Wickline, the court held that the physician who
complies without protest with the limitations imposed by a third-party payer
cannot avoid ultimate responsibility for his patient's care when his medical
judgment dictates otherwise.23 On review, the Wilson court acknowledged that
Wicidine did not correctly state the law; rather, the Wickline court stated mere
dicta, and not the law with respect to the issue of causation in a tort case.232
The Wilson court indicated that the language and holding in Wickline resulted
from regulatory requirements in the Medi-Cal Act that abrogated normal tort
responsibility standards. 233 The Wilson court further declared that material
issues of fact existed with respect to the defendants' potential liability, and
reversed the summary judgment orders.2M In reaching its decision, the court
noted that Western Medical had contracted with Blue Cross of California and
not Alabama Blue Cross, and that it was totally unaware of the relevant terms
of the policy between Mr. Wilson and Alabama Blue Cross.235 The relevant
provisions of the contract clearly indicated that the decision relating to
hospitalization benefits for mental and nervous disorders was to be made by the
attending physician.2 36 The facts in the record revealed that it was Western
Medical Review that told the hospital that costs for further care would not be
paid.237
Most recently, a jury in California awarded an estate over $85,000,000.00
arising from an HMO's decision to deny a bone marrow transplant to a mother
226. Id. at 880-81.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 878.
230. Id. at 880.
231. Id. at 879-80, 884.
232. Id. at 879-80.
233. Id. at 880.
234. Id. at 882, 885.
235. Id. at 879-81, 883.
236. Id. at 880-81.
237. Id. at 882.
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of three children. The case, Fox v. Health Net, reported in the Newsweek
article referred to above, sent shock waves through the managed care
industry. 3 In Fox, the HMO refused to approve a bone marrow transplant on
the ground that it was investigational, although the contract language arguably
indicated otherwise.
In Wilson unilateral decisions, unsupported as a result of the policy
provisions in the contract issued by Alabama Blue Cross lead to a series of
tragic events. The decision made by Western Medical Review may in fact have
been correct, if the policy in question had been issued by Blue Cross of
Southern California. In Fox, vague and ambiguous contract language resulted
in disaster, not only for the IMO, but the subscriber and her family as well.
Therefore, the lesson from Wilson239 and Fox is that consistency and uniformity
in contract language, UM review, and processing is a critical function which
cannot be ignored. These lessons and others are apparent in the few decisions
to date, discussed in the following section.
B. Inappropriate Selection and Decision Making
In Wilson, the plaintiff's third amended complaint appeared to contain
claims solely related to the defendants' alleged tortious conduct in breaching
the contract of insurance between the plaintiff and Alabama Blue Cross. 240
Although the claims asserted were, in all likelihood, narrowly focused as a
result of the favorable language contained in the controlling contract, if the
facts had been slightly different, the plantiffs could have asserted additional
claims. These claims could have included a corporate negligence claim against
Blue Cross of Southern California for negligent selection or decision making
by the independent UM entity, Western Medical Review, with whom it was
under contract. Although to date there is sparse case law directly addressing
liability claims arising from cost containment mechanisms in managed care,
existing case law dealing with liability claims in the traditional health care
setting provide some framework by way of analogy.
Corporate negligence in a health care context is one of many liability
theories whose roots are found in the traditional health care delivery setting.
This doctrine, first recognized in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
238. Fox v. Healthnet, No. 21962 (Sup. Ct., Riverside County, California).
239. Interestingly, in the six years since its publication, Wilson has been cited just twice
with respect to issues concerning UM. In both cases the defendants prevailed. See Steineke v.
Share Health Plan of Nebraska, 518 N.W.2d 904 (Neb. 1994) and Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
240. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81.
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Hospital,241' holds that a hospital entity may be liable for negligence arising
from its failure to adhere to established regulations and standards created to
protect those individuals seeking treatment at its facilities.242 In Darling, the
plaintiff was taken to the hospital after being injured in a high school football
game.243 The hospital, Charleston Community Memorial, was accredited by
the Joint Commission on Accreditation 2" and licensed by the state of Illinois. 245
Hospital personnel determined that the plaintiff had suffered a broken leg and
applied a plaster cast. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff began to suffer
considerable discomfort, which hospital personnel noted.2 6 The physician who
had originally set the cast notched the cast several days later and ultimately
split both sides which revealed blood and seepage.247 The plaintiff was
transferred to another hospital almost eleven days later where his leg was
amputated after unsuccessful efforts to save it.248 The Supreme Court of
Illinois, affirming the judgment of the lower court in favor of the plaintiff,
determined that the nurses failed to properly attend the plaintiff, the attending
physician was not qualified to perform orthopedic procedures, and the hospital
failed to set up standards and procedures to confirm compliance with the
relevant and controlling regulations, accreditation standards, and bylaws.249
As indicated in Darling, and numerous cases which have since followed,
a hospital's (or managed care organization's) failure to uphold the proper
standard of care it owes to its patients and provide for the safety of those
patients may result in liability.250 The underlying basis for this doctrine of
corporate liability is that the hospital assumes numerous responsibilities in
providing a facility for the treatment of illness. Many of those responsibilities
and obligations, as indicated in Darling, arise as a result of accreditation
standards and statutory requirements. 251' These standards and requirements
include the proper selection of providers who will treat patients in the hospital.
Since the Darling decision, cases have addressed the issue of negligent
selection of providers in the hospital and, recently, in managed care. A
majority of these cases have raised corporate negligence claims against
hospitals or managed care organizations due to a negligent provider who had
241. 211 N.E.2d 253 (Il1. 1965).
242. Id. at 257.
243. Id. at 255.
244. Id. at 256. This commission is now known as the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Health Care Organizations.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 255.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 256.
249. Id. at 258.




been granted staff privileges or appointment to a panel of providers. In the UM
context, these cases must be respected and carefully considered when
establishing a UM program, contracting with an independent UM entity, or
merely monitoring UM for quality control purposes. From the standpoint of
selection, UM is increasingly subject to regulation, and, as previously
discussed, accreditation standards continue to develop. In light of these
developments, a managed care entity's or- hospital's failure to follow UM
guidelines or due diligence responsibilities could breed disaster.
Although there are presently no reported decisions which have dealt with
a claim asserting liability for improper selection or retention of a UM program,
the decisions in Wickline, Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc.,252 and McClellan
v. Health Maintenance Organization of Pennsylvania253 are somewhat
analogous, and they provide some guidance in avoiding pitfalls associated with
improper selection. As indicated by the court in Wickline, liability can arise
where a cost containment system is defectively designed or implemented.
254
In Harrell, the plaintiff asserted several claims, including a corporate neg-
ligence claim against Total Health Care, as the result of injuries she suffered
due to the malpractice of Dr. Witt.25' Dr. Witt had been appointed by the
plaintiff's medical service plan to a panel of providers. 6 The service plan,
Total Health Care (an IPA model), entered into contracts with physicians to
provide care to subscribers whose employers contracted directly or indirectly
with Total Health Care.25 ' As a result of medical complications, plaintiff's
primary care physician referred her to Dr. Witt who was listed as a specialist
in a publication prepared by Total Health Care. The evidence revealed that
Total Health Care conducted no extensive review of those specialists it chose
to serve on its provider panel. In fact, no personal interview was conducted,
no references check made, and there was no confirmation of the provider's
reputation in the community.2 Such precautions would have revealed that Dr.
Witt had been sued for malpractice on numerous occasions.259 Plaintiff, in
support of her corporate negligence claim, asserted that Total Health Care had
a non-delegable duty to plan subscribers to carefully select the providers with
whom it contracted so that subscribers would be protected against referrals to
252. 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989).
253. McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org. of Pennsylvania, 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992).
254. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670-71.
255. Harrell, 781 S.W.2d at 59.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 59-60.
258. Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., No. WD 39809, 1989 WL 153066, *3 (Mo. Ct.
App. Apr. 25, 1989).
259. Id.
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incompetent practitioners.? In language that clearly implicated managed care
arrangements, the court determined that the doctrine of corporate negligence
was not limited to hospitals. 26' In so holding, the court determined that Total
Health Care had a duty to its subscribers to conduct a reasonable investigation,
and in not doing so, it had failed to discharge its duty to prevent foreseeable
harm.262 Although the plaintiff in Harrel was ultimately precluded from
recovery due to an immunity statute, the decision illustrates the obligations a
managed care entity has in carrying out its UM responsibilities.263
In McClellan, a decedent's estate brought corporate negligence, fraud,
agency, and breach of contract claims against an HMO and treating physicians
for conduct which allegedly caused the decedent's death.264 The decedent had
a mole removed from her back by a primary care physician she had selected
through the HMO's provider brochure. 265 The physician failed to have the
mole tested for malignancy. 266 The decedent in fact had melanoma and died
several years later.267 The claims referred to above were asserted against the
physician and the HMO.2" The claims in part were based upon representations
of the HMO that "each and every primary care physician provided by [the
HMO] satisfied criteria for participation as a qualified physician afterpassing
vigorous screening criteria."269 The court held that it was not necessary to
extend the doctrine of corporate negligence to an IPA model HMO because the
HMO had a non-delegable duty to select and retain competent primary care
physicians.270 In so holding, the court was guided by Section 323 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and went on to explain the necessary elements
for asserting a claim against an IIMO. 271 The factors the court described are as
260. Id.
261. Id. at *4.
262. Id. at *5.
263. Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989); see also Insinga v.
LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989) (stating that hospitals are in the best position to protect
their patients and consequently, have an independent duty to select and retain competent
independent physicians seeking staff privileges); Blanton v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.,
354 S.E.2d 455 (N.C. 1987) (declaring that failure to enforce the standards of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals is some evidence of a hospital's negligence in a
corporate context); Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1980)
(holding that failure to investigate a medical staff applicant's qualifications for requested
privileges gives rise to a foreseeable risk of unreasonable harm and a hospital has a duty to
exercise due care in the selection of its medical staff).
264. McClellan, 604 A.2d at 1055-56.




269. Id. at 1057 (emphasis added).




follows: to render services to the plaintiff subscriber; which the -IMO should
recognize as necessary for the protection of its subscriber; that the HMOfailed
to exercise reasonable care in selecting, retaining, and/or evaluating the
plaintiff's primary care physician, and, that as a result of the HIO's failure to
use such reasonable care, the risk of harm to the subscriber was increased.272
Improper decision making in a UM context was also implicated as a
potential area of concern for managed care organizations as a result of the
Wickline decision.273 As indicated by the court, liability may result where
appeals made on a patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily
ignored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden. 4  In addition to the
corporate negligence cases discussed above, cases which provide guidance
include bad faith claims asserted against insurance companies arising from their
decisions to deny coverage to their insureds.2 5 For example, in Hughes v. Blue
Cross of Northern California276 an insured under a group health plan asserted
bad faith claims against the insurer for denying coverage for psychiatric
hospitalization for her son.277 The evidence at trial revealed a UM program in
disarray that reflected "established company practice" according to the court.278
In Hughes, the factors which lead to a finding that Blue Cross had acted in bad
faith included a UM process which relied upon a cursory review of fragmentary
records, the consultant's disclaimer of any obligation to investigate, use of a
standard of "medical necessity" at variance with community standards, and
uninformative follow-up letters which were sent to treating physicians.279 In
Rederscheid v. Comprecare, Inc. the plaintiff was permitted to assert a breach
of contract and bad faith claim against her HMO as a result of its failure to pay
for corrective oral and jaw surgery.280
Foreseeable claims arising from UM decisions could also be based upon
many of the factors outlined in the Hughes case, including a failure to review
complete and accurate records,28' failure to communicate with the attending
272. Id.
273. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670-71.
274. Id.
275. PATRICIA A. YOUNGER ET AL., MANAGED CARE LAW MANUAL, BASIS FOR LIABILITY
12-13 (1995).
276. 263 Cal. Rptr. 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 858.
279. Id.
280. 667 P.2d 766 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
281. Schleier v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 876 F.2d 174
(D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1987)
(evidencing that health insurer's denial of claim, disputing reasonable necessity of insured's
hospitalization, without benefit of progress notes and nurses' notes, was sufficient to sustain
finding of bad faith refusal to pay claim); Taylor v. Prudential Ins. Co., 775 F.2d 1457 (11 th
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physician prior to making a coverage decision,282 decisions which are arbitrary
and cannot in good faith be supported,28 3 and failure to notify a subscriber of
his or her right to appeal an adverse decision.2
As seen from the decisions referenced above, the doctrine of corporate
negligence is potentially a viable claim for plaintiffs to assert in situations
where inappropriate UM selection, retention, monitoring or decision making
has taken place. Other claims may include breach of contract/bad faith,
2 5
respondeat superior,28 6 fraud and misrepresentation,2 7 and apparent or
ostensible agency.288 Whatever the claim, managed care entities can best
protect themselves and their subscribers by being constantly attentive to the
UM process through strict quality control. Steps that can help avoid improper
UM selection or decision making liability claims include, but are not limited
to, the following: confirmation of licensing and accreditation; adherence to
unambiguous TM standards and policies; selection of competent reviewers;
continuing education programs for reviewers; taking all precautions necessary
to ensure that reviewers do not interfere with the provider's responsibility for
making patient treatment decisions; allowing decisions to be made by only
those personnel who are qualified to consider the medical issue at hand; proper
review of complete and relevant records; second opinion procedures; attending
physician approval of UM decision where feasible; accurate contractual and
marketing material; appropriate subscriber notification procedures; and
effective appeal and review procedures.
289
Cir. 1985).
282. Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675 (Ariz. 1986).
283. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670-71.
284. Sarchett v. Blue Shield of California, 729 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1987); Williams v.
HealthAmerica, 535 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
285. See McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org. of Pennsylvania, 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa.
1992); Fox v. Health Net, No. 21962 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.); Hedrick v. Sanus Texas
Health Plan, Inc., No. 2864 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 18th Judicial, May 1991).
286. Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc., 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987) (finding a material issue of disputed fact existed as to whether there were usual
requisites of agency or employer-employee relationship between HMO and employee-physician
precluded summary judgment as to whether HMO was vicariously liable for physicians alleged
malpractice).
287. Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
288. Id. at 1234-35; see also Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995).
289. Dowell, supra note 98, at 127-30; BENDA, supra note 112, at § 12. The National
Association of Insurance Commissioners has recently developed model laws pertaining to
utilization review entitled, Utilization Review ModelAct, reprinted in N.A.I.C. MODEL LAWS,
REGULATIONS & GUIDELINES, vol. I, at 1-73 to 1-12.
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VII. FINANCIAL INCENTIVE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN HEALTH-CARE
PROVIDERS AND PAYERS: THE ISSUE OF POTENTIAL LIABILITY
An additional area of potential liability results from financial incentive
arrangements between health care providers and payers. The potential for
liability arising from various financial incentives and arrangements between
managed care organizations and providers has been the subject of numerous
articles.290 Although the various arrangements discussed in section IV above
and potential liability claims that arise from such arrangements may at first
seem appealing to plaintiffs' lawyers and critics of managed care, the courts
have to date unanimously rejected them as a matter of law. Importantly,
studies have revealed that the quality of care does not tend to differ for those
treated in pre-paid health plans as compared to traditional fee-for-service health
care.
291
Most of the legal opinions have indicated that the regulation or prohibition
of financial incentives is an area of exclusive legislative concern or that such
incentives do not override the provider's ethical and legal duty to the patient.'92
For example, in McClellan the plaintiff attempted to attack the heart of
managed care, alleging that the agreements between the HMO and its primary
care physicians were tortious. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that as a result
of system design, which included a capitation arrangement between the HMO
and its panel of providers, it was against the primary care physicians personal
and pecuniary interest to give proper medical advice and make appropriate
290. See David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician Relationship,
5 HEALTH MATRix 141 (1995); Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided
Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED.
241 (1995); E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL.
L. REv. 1719 (1987).
291. See Orentlicher, supra note 290, at 161-66. See Dolores G. Clement et al., Access and
Outcomes of Elderly Patients Enrolled in Managed Care, 271 JAMA 1487 (1994) (noting that
there were no differences in outcome between the HMO and fee-for-service patients with chest
pain); Paula Braveman et al., Insurance-Related Differences in the Risk of Ruptured Appendix,
331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 444 (1994) (showing that HMO patients receive more preventive tests
and examinations than patients who subscribe to traditional fee-for-service plans for their health
care coverage).
292. See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Ethical and Legal Standards For Physicians Be
Changed To Accommodate New Models For Rationing Care?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1809 (1992);
Paul v. Humana Medical Plan, Inc., 682 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). The court rejected
plaintiff's assertion that capitation arrangement between physicians and HMO caused
physicians to avoid providing additional care to plaintiff allowed for a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. The court found that even if such conduct on the part of
the physicians occured, the only claim plaintiffs could assert against the physicians would be
medical malpractice. Id.
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referrals. In language worth quoting in its entirety, the court in its analysis
rejected the plaintiff's claim for the following reasons:
This allegation suggests as issues whether the essential elements of the
HMO system violate public policy, and whether the HMO system itself
contributed to the asserted malpractice in this case. It is settled beyond
peradventure, however, that the judicial branch is precluded by constitu-
tional mandate from addressing the ethical, moral, or social implications
of a health care program which indirectly provides a diminished compensa-
tion for a provider who deems further medical attention necessary or
desirable. The fundamental prerogative and duty of considering and
establishing social policy, including, of course, the regulation of health
care providers, is vested solely in the legislature." 3
Although decided at an early stage in the litigation,294 it is hard to imagine
that the physician (purportedly corrupted by a financial incentive system, if
any, in place) in McClellan, other than making a terrible mistake, did so in
order to avoid spending the approximately $200 to $300 dollars it would have
cost to perform the appropriate histology. The provider has simply too much
at stake to take such a risk. Such risks include a potential malpractice claim,
being referenced in the National Practitioner Data Bank, revocation of
privileges, or all of the foregoing. It is well recognized that a physician is a
fiduciary, and thus any financial or ethical conflict must be resolved in favor
of the patient.295
However, it appears that for a minority of providers, full reimbursement
is of greater concern than patient welfare. The court addressed this issue in
Varol v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan.296 In Varol, psychiatrists
participating in a pilot program providing mental health services to union
members sought relief in the district court, alleging that the programs
requirements of pre-authorization review and other managed care obligations
violated Michigan law and deprived the physicians of other due process
rights.297  The physicians complained that the pre-authorization review
293. McClellan, 604 A.2d at 1056 n.6. See also Teti v. U.S. Healthcare Inc., Civ. A. Nos.
88-9808, 88-9822, 1989 WL 143274 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 1989), aff'd, 904 F.2d 696 (3d Cir.
1990) (affirming dismissal of a complaint asserting RICO claims on an HMO's concealment
of a compensation referral fund).
294. McClellan, 604 A.2d at 1054-56. The HMO's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims
were granted by the trial court. Id.
295. Rodwin, supra note 290, at 246.
296. 708 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1989); contra Bush v. Dake, No. 86-25767NM-2 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. April 27, 1989). In Bush, the plaintiff alleged that her cancer would have been
diagnosed sooner but for certain financial incentives to reduce utilization established between
the HMO and her treating physician. Id.
297. Varol, 708 F. Supp. at 826, 834.
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procedure interfered with their right and obligation to determine the methods
of diagnosis and treatment for patients.29 In addition, the physicians argued
that the threat that they would not be paid or only partially paid would unfairly
influence them to render treatment other than what the provider in good faith
believed should be offered.299 In absolutely rejecting the argument against the
establishment of the UM program in question (or financial incentive arrange-
ments between health care providers and payers), the court engaged in the
following dialogue:
Irrespective of any obligation I have to my patients and to my profession,
my judgment as to what is in the best interests of my patients will not be
determined by the exercise of my medical judgment, but by how much I
will be paid for my services. Plaintiffs are saying in effect, "Since I am
weak in my resolve to afford proper treatment, Blue Cross's pre-authoriza-
tion program would induce me to breach my ethical and legal duties, and
the court must protect me from my own weakness." In other words protect
me from my own misconduct. This is strange stuff indeed from which to
fashion a legal argument. After all, the program is designed to make
certain that only medically necessary services are provided and paid for.
This is a legitimate objective, whether applied to a post-service reimburse-
ment program or a concurrent review and pre-authorization program....
Cost containment in any program must deal with policing the necessity of
the services rendered and payment therefore. GM and the U.A.W. are
entitled to join together to make that effort. And it appears altogether
inappropriate for the plaintiffs to say that the program will induce them to
breach their duties to their patients.?
For the very small number of providers that fall in this category, managed
care organizations must carry out a very intensive screening process to avoid
selection of these individuals. For those who slip through the process, practice
patterns must be constantly reviewed in an effort to detect questionable medical
decisions and, for those who engage in such conduct, notification of the proper
professional licensing boards is in order.30 ' Legislatures and government
agencies are also free to establish reasonable rules and regulations as suggested
by the court in McClellan.30 2 Recently, the Department of Health and Human
Services published a proposed final rule which would prohibit Medicare and
298. Id. at 831.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 833.
301. One school of thought is that the managed care organization should be required to
disclose to its members any existing physician financial incentive arrangements. See McGraw,
supra note 71, at 1836-39.
302. McClellan, 604 A.2d at 1056, n.6.
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Medicaid managed care plans from making specific payments to providers to
limit or reduce medically necessary services to a specific enrollee. 0 3 The rule
would also require that the plan disclose to the Health Care Financing
Administration or state Medicaid agency physician incentive plans, and upon
a plan subscriber's request, provide a summary of plan benefits. 3"
To attack any form of financial incentive arrangement program with
health care providers as a per se violation of the standard of care misses the
point. As indicated in the Wilson decision, a managed care entity can no longer
lay all the blame at the feet of the provider when things go awry.35 That being
the case, it is the providers ethical and professional obligation, as indicated in
Varol, to provide competent and proper care.306 If in doing so, a UM decision
is made that is not based upon established criteria and standards, but upon
financial considerations alone, then the managed care organization as a
corporate entity may potentially suffer the liability consequences, subject to the
preemptions discussed in the next section.30 7
VIII. THE IMPACT OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME AND
SECURITY ACT ON EMERGING LIABILITY CLAIMS (ERISA)
ERISA was enacted by Congress in 1974 in order to protect participants
in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries. These goals were to be
303. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans in
Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,430 (1996). Section 417.479(2)(d) entitled
"Prohibited Physician Payments" states as follows:
No specific payment of any kind may be made directly or indirectly under the
incentive plan to a physician or physician group as an inducement to reduce or limit
covered medically necessary services covered under the organization's contract
furnished to an individual enrollee. Indirect payments include offerings of monetary
value (such as stock options or waivers of debt) measured in the past or future.
Id.
304. Id.
305. Wilson v. Blue Cross of California, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1990).
306. Varol v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 708 F. Supp. 826, 833-34 (E.D. Mich.
1989).
307. Sherry Boschert, "Corporatization " May Take Liability Heat Off MDs, INTERNAL
MEDICINE NEWS, vol. 67, no. 29, March 1, 1996. Stating:
Increasing 'corporatization' of health care may shift malpractice lawsuits away from
physicians and incline juries to reach deep into the pockets of faceless health
systems.... Some potential advantages of integrated health care enterprises might
lead to a reduction in the number of malpractice suits filed in the future. Total
quality management plans, practice protocols, and utilization review could improve
the quality of care. A stronger ability to develop communication links and
implement information technologies also might nip some problems in the bud.
Id. at 67. See also Bruce Japson, Balancing Risk, 26 MODERN HEALTHCARE 44, Oct. 28, 1996,
at 41-46 (discussing the trend of hospitals and health systems attempting to bring physicians
under the same professional liability umbrella).
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achieved by requiring the disclosure and reporting of financial and other
information and the establishment of standards of conduct for fiduciaries of
employee benefit plans. ERISA established for employees and their beneficia-
ries appropriate remedies, sanctions, and access to the federal courts.08 In
addition to protecting employee benefit plan participants and beneficiaries,
ERISA was enacted to replace the overlapping scheme of state regulation of
employee benefit plans with a uniform set of federal regulations.0 9 In the
managed care arena, ERISA is particularly important in that it has provided
some protection from liability claims purportedly arising from UM and other
cost containment activities. Before reviewing relevant legal decisions, a review
of the controlling ERISA provisions is in order.
In relevant part, ERISA defines an "employee welfare benefit plan" as
including:
any plan, fund, or program that was heretofore or is hereafter established
or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both,
to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is
maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits.31
ERISA applies to "any employee benefit plan if it is established or
maintained by an employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity
affecting commerce., 31  Employee welfare benefit plans which fall outside of
the scope of ERISA are identified in United States Department of Labor
regulations as:
a group or group-type insurance program offered by an insurer to
employees or members of an employee organization under which: (1) no
contributions are made by an employer or employee organization; (2)
participation [in] the program is completely voluntary for employees or
members; (3) the sole functions of the employer or employee organization
with respect to the program are, without endorsing the program, to permit
the insurer to publicize the program to employees or members, to collect
premiums through payroll deductions and to remit them to the insurer; and,
(4) the employer or employee organization receives no consideration in the
form of cash or otherwise in connection with the program, other than
308. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
309. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
310. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(I)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
311. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1) (1994).
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reasonable compensation, excluding any profit, for administrative services
actually rendered in connection with payroll deductions.312
The existence of an ERISA plan is a question of fact to be resolved in
light of all surrounding facts and circumstances from the point of view of a
reasonable person.3 13 Case law indicates that an employer may have (but has
not necessarily) established an ERISA plan if it's main involvement is to
contribute to the payment of the premiums. If the employer does not contribute
to the premiums, but merely transmits the employee's premiums without
endorsing the policy or profiting from the program, no ERISA plan has been
established. However, whether the employer contributes premiums or not, if
it has endorsed the program in the sense that the employer is significantly
involved in it, an ERISA plan may have been established. The ultimate
determination depends on an evaluation of all the circumstances, keeping in
mind ERISA's purpose of regulating an employer's administration of benefit
plans.314 Employee coverage through an HMO falls under ERISA if the
program through which the coverage was obtained is sponsored by an
employer.315
The critical provisions of ERISA which are of importance to managed
care organizations are contained in the preemption clause.316 The preemption
clause of ERISA preempts all state laws that relate to employee benefit plans
whether or not the state laws are designed to affect employee benefit plans.
The United States Supreme Court in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon
indicated that the phrase "relate to" expands preemption beyond state laws that
relate to the specific subjects covered by ERISA, such as reporting, disclosure
and fiduciary obligations.1 7 The Tenth Circuit in Airparts Company v. Custom
Benefit Services ofAustin, Inc. identified the following four categories of laws
which relate to an employee benefit plan:
312. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j) (1994).
313. Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11 th Cir. 1982).
314. Rizzi v. Blue Cross of Southern California, 253 Cal. Rptr. 542, 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th
Dist. 1989).
315. Scullion v. Travelers Health Network, 720 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
316. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994). There are two types of ERISA preemption. First, conflict
preemption wherein federal law supersedes state law which relates to employee benefit plans.
The second type of preemption is complete preemption, concerning certain claims involving
the enforcement or clarification of benefit rights and plan administration. In Prihoda v. Shpritz,
914 F. Supp. 113 (D. Md. 1996), a district court ruled that only complete preemption creates
federal jurisdiction. According to the court in Prihoda, when the complete preemption doctrine
is inapplicable, but the lawsuit contains a state law claim that is potentially preempted under
conflict preemption, the lawsuit cannot be removed to federal court, rather the preemption
defense must be resolved in the state court proceedings. Id. at 118.
317. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137-40 (1990).
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(i) laws that regulate the type of benefits or terms of ERISA plans; (ii) laws
that create reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting requirements for
ERISA plans; (iii) laws that provide rules for the calculation of the amount
of benefits to be paid under ERISA plans; and, (iv) laws and common-law
rules that provide remedies for misconduct growing out of the administra-
tion of the ERISA plan.318
The effect of the preemption clause, savings clause, and deemer clause
must be considered in deciding whether a particular state law claim is
preempted under ERISA. The preemption clause provides that:
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the savings clause] the
provisions of this Title and Title IV shall supersede any and all state laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in [section 1003 (a)] and not exempt under [section 1003 (a)].319
The savings clause in relevant part states that "except as provided in
subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause] nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any state which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.,320 Finally, the deemer clause
provides that:
neither an employee benefit plan... nor any trust established under such
a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank,
trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of
insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to
regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust compa-
nies, or investment companies.
321
In considering the three provisions above, the United States Supreme
Court established the appropriate test in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.322
The Court held that one must analyze whether the state statutory claims or
common law claims asserted in the lawsuit relate to an employee benefit plan
and thus fall within ERISA's preemption clause.3" The Supreme Court in
Ingersoll-Rand provided more guidance when it held that a law would relate
to an employee benefit plan when it has a connection with or reference to such
318. Airparts Co. v. Custom Benefit Servs. of Austin, Inc., 28 F. 3d 1062, 1064-65 (10th
Cir. 1994).
319. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
320. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
321. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994) (emphasis added).
322. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
323. Id. at 47.
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a plan.324 Under this analysis, a law will be preempted under ERISA even
though it was not intended to affect such a plan or the effect is only incidental.
With respect to common law claims such as breach of contract or negligence,
these claims as well will be preempted if they relate to an employee benefit
plan and do not come within any of the ERISA exemptions. 25
Under ERISA, a participant's or beneficiary's remedies are limited to the
recovery of benefits, enforcement of rights, or the clarification of future
benefits under the plan.326 Thus, claims which seek compensatory or punitive
damages will not permitted if they come within the provisions outlined above.
This is particularly important for managed care organizations, administrators,
and employers who are striving to maintain quality health care at affordable
rates. With respect to cost containment mechanisms such as UM, several
courts, including those in Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc.,327 Tolton v.
American Biodyne, Inc., 328and Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan of Kansas
City, Inc.329 have decided that liability claims based on a purported negligent
or improper decision relating to a plan participant's eligibility for benefits, are
preempted by ERISA.
In Corcoran, a wrongful death claim alleging that the defendants were
responsible for the death of the plaintiff's unborn fetus was filed in state court
against Blue Cross of Alabama and United Healthcare.33° The plaintiff,
Florence Corcoran, was an employee of a telephone company and received
health benefits through a plan funded by her employer and administered by
Blue Cross of Alabama.33' The plan required pre-certification review for
designated medical procedures and overnight hospital stays. 332 Corcoran's
employer contracted with United Healthcare to perform the utilization review
function on its behalf3 33 During her pregnancy, Corcoran experienced
complications which lead her physician to recommend complete bed rest for
the remainder of her pregnancy. 334  United Healthcare determined that
hospitalization was unnecessary, and authorized ten hours a day of home
324. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 138-39.
325. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (1994).
326. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
327. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
328. 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995).
329. 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1045 (1994).
330. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1324.
331. Id. at 1323.
332. Id. at 1323.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 1322.
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nursing care.3 ' The fetus went into distress and died at a time when no nurse
was on duty.336
The original state court lawsuit was removed to federal court by United
Healthcare, and later dismissed by the district court on the basis that the claims
were preempted by ERISA. 37 Corcoran appealed the dismissal to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed. On appeal, the Corcorans argued
that Pilot Life Insurance was inapplicable in that the tort claims asserted were
based upon an improper medical decision, and not upon the improper
processing of benefits.338 Corcoran argued that in Independence HMO, Inc. v.
Smith, the federal district court held that ERISA did not preempt medical
malpractice claims.339 The court in rejecting Corcoran's argument determined
that although United Healthcare gave medical advice, it did so while deciding
what benefits were available to the plan subscriber.3'4 Thus, the court'applied
29 U.S.C. § 1144 of ERISA, which mandated preemption of Corcoran's
claims.34
In Tolton, an action was brought in state court on behalf of the decedent,
arising from a claimed improper denial of benefits.342 The decedent, Henry
Tolton was employed by United Way-Big Brothers/Big Sisters of Greater
Cleveland. 4 3 United Way provided group health insurance to Tolton through
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company." This plan was administered
by CIGNA Health Plan of Ohio ("CIGNA") pursuant to a managed care
option. 345 There was no dispute that the plan was a qualified employee benefit
plan pursuant to ERISA.3" CIGNA contracted with American Biodyne to
provide mental health benefits to plan participants.347 The facts in the record
revealed that Tolton was addicted to drugs and sought evaluation and treatment
from American Biodyne.?" Approximately four months after first seeking
treatment, Tolton committed suicide.349 Tolton's state law action included
335. Id. at 1324.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 1324-26.
338. Id. at 1330.
339. Id. at 1333, n.16. See Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa.
1990).
340. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1332.
341. Id. at 1338.
342. Tolton, 48 F.3d at 940-41.
343. Id. at 939.




348. Id. at 940.
349. Id.
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wrongful death, improper refusal to authorize benefits, medical malpractice,
and insurance bad faith claims.35° These claims all arose from American
Biodyne's refusal to authorize psychiatric benefits to Tolton under the plan.
Affirming the entry of a summary judgment against Tolton, the circuit court
determined that utilization review was a means of processing claims, and as a
result the negligence claim was preempted under the provisions of ERISA1
51
In addition the court also rejected Tolton's bad faith claims relying on Pilot
Life Insurance wherein the Supreme Court held that a bad faith claim arising
from the processing of benefits was preempted by ERISA.352 In Pilot Life
Insurance the Supreme Court held that an insurance bad faith claim was not
preserved under ERISA's savings clause in that it was derived from tort and
contract principles and not directed exclusively at the insurance industry. 53
The Supreme Court also decided that a bad faith claim did not fall within the
McCarran-Ferguson Act 'S 54 definition of the "business of insurance" in that
such claims did not spread risk and only indirectly affected the relationship
between the insurer and insured.3"
Finally, in Kuhl, Belger Cartage Services employee health plan was
administered by Lincoln National Health Plan.356 The health plan was a
network model HMO.357 Under the provisions of the plan, Lincoln National
was not required to pay for medical services rendered outside of the service
area. 58 In addition, the plan had a UM program in place that conducted pre-
certification review.359 In 1989, Mr. Kuhl, who was an employee of Belger
Cartage Services and covered under the employee health plan, suffered a heart
attack.3" After extensive examination, Mr. Kuhl's physicians determined that
it was necessary for him to undergo heart surgery as soon as possible. Because
Kansas City area hospitals did not have the proper equipment to conduct the
surgery, the physicians recommended that Mr. Kuhl travel to Barnes Hospital
in St. Louis.361 The surgery was scheduled for July 6, 1989.362 Prior to the
surgery, Lincoln National contacted Mr. Kuhl and informed him that the
surgery would not be paid for, as the surgery was to be performed outside of
350. Id. at 939.
351. Id. at 941-43.
352. Id. at 942 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987)).
353. Tolton, 48 F.3d at 942.
354. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
355. Id.; see Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 50-51.









the service benefit area.363 Lincoln National thereafter scheduled Mr. Kuhl to
be examined for a second opinion.364 The physician who examined Mr. Kuhl
determined that the surgery was indeed necessary. On July 20, 1989, Lincoln
National informed Mr. Kuhl that he could proceed with the surgery in St.
Louis.3 6 Unfortunately, the surgeons could not reschedule until September.
In September, Mr. Kuhl was examined shortly before his surgery at which time
it was determined that surgery was no longer a viable option. Mr. Kuhl was
then placed on the transplant waiting list.366 However, Mr. Kuhl died before
a donor was located.367 Mr. Kuhl's family brought suit against Lincoln
National in state court, alleging that Lincoln National committed medical
malpractice, among other claims. Lincoln National removed the case to the
federal district court pursuant to ERISA.3 68 Thereafter, the court granted
Lincoln National's motion for summary judgment determining that the Kuhl's
claims were preempted under ERISA in that they related to the administration
of the employer health plan.3 69 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit rejected the
Kuhl's argument that Lincoln National assumed the role of Mr. Kuhl's
physician and made improper decisions concerning his care.370 Further, the
Kuhls alleged that Lincoln National took on the role of physician by
"cancel[ing]" Mr. Kuhl's first scheduled surgery in July of 1989.3 1' The court
rejected this argument as well, holding that Lincoln National's decision not to
pre-certify payment for the surgery related directly to its obligation to
administer benefits on behalf of Mr. Kuhl's employer.3 72 However, it is critical
for managed care organizations to note that the court did indicate that under
different facts, the cancellation of a beneficiary's surgery by an ERISA benefits
provider could result in a non-preempted state law claim.373 The distinction the
court attempted to make in Kuhl is that under such circumstances, the managed
care organization has assumed the role of an arranger of health care or






367. Id. at 298-300.
368. Id. at 300-01.
369. Id. at 301.
370. Id. at 302.
371. Id. at 303.
372. Id.
373. Id. (stating, "We do not imply that how the surgery was canceled would be immaterial
in every case. In a different case, the cancellation of a beneficiary's surgery by an ERISA
benefits provider may lay the basis for non-preempted state law claims.").
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The Third Circuit in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.374 held that under the
well-pleaded complaint rule ERISA does not act to preempt state law claims
against an HMO for medical negligence where the claims did not question a
denial of benefits, but rather the quality of benefits received.375 In Dukes, the
court consolidated two cases involving claims which had been asserted against
U.S. Health Care Systems of Pennsylvania, Inc. and the Health Maintenance
Organization of Pennsylvania/New Jersey (collectively the "HMO"). 376 In the
first case consolidated by the court, the plaintiff, Cecilia Dukes filed a claim in
a Pennsylvania state court against numerous defendants, including United
States Health Care Systems of Pennsylvania, Inc., a federally qualified HMO
which had been organized by U.S. Healthcare. 377 The lawsuit arose as a result
of the death of Cecilia Dukes's husband, Darryl Dukes.378 In the lawsuit, Mrs.
Dukes alleged that the IMO which provided treatment to her husband was
responsible under a negligent selection and monitoring theory and ostensible
agency theory, for the negligent actions of the various doctors and other
medical-service providers who cared for her husband shortly before his
death. 379 The HMO removed the case to the district court which ultimately
dismissed the claims against the HMO pursuant to the preemption provisions
of ERISA, and remanded to the state court the remaining claims against the
individual defendants.80 In the second case consolidated by the court, Ronald
and Linda Visconti also filed suit in a Pennsylvania state court against the
HMO under ostensible and actual agency theories, asserting that the IMO held
out the treating physician as a competent and qualified obstetrician-gynecolo-
gist.38 l The couple filed suit after Mrs. Viscontis's physician allegedly failed
to properly treat symptoms typical of preeclampsia resulting in the death of
374. 57 F.3d 350, 353-54 (3d Cir. 1995). "Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a cause
of action 'arises under' federal law, and removal is proper, only if a federal question is
presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. A federal defense to a
plaintiff's state law cause of action ordinarily does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded
complaint, and, therefore, usually is insufficient to warrant removal to federal court. Therefore,
the defense of preemption is usually insufficient basis to remove a case from state to federal
court." Id. (internal citation omitted). An exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule applies
where complete preemption results from an act of Congress which completely preempts a
particular area of law. "The Supreme Court has determined that Congress intended that the
complete preemption doctrine apply to state law causes of action which fit within ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994)." Id.
375. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355-61.
376. Id. at 353.
377. Id. at 352.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 353. See Dukes v. United States Health Care Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39, 42
(E.D. Pa. 1994).
381. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 353.
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their child.2 Again, as in Mrs. Dukes's case, the HMO removed the case to
the district court which ultimately dismissed the claims against the HIO
pursuant to the preemption provisions of ERISA.3 83 The plaintiffs' appealed,
and after consolidating the two cases the Third Circuit reversed. Although the
Dukes opinion at first glance appeared to sound the death-knell for the UM
administration and benefit review preemption under ERISA, the court did not
go quite so far. The court noted that the plaintiffs were not claiming that their
welfare plans refused to pay or provide medical services, but rather, that the
plan provided low quality medical care.1 4 Thus the court indicated it was
confident that a claim attacking the quality of benefits was not a claim under
ERISA to recover "benefits due.., under the terms of [the] plan. 3 5 On this
precise issue, relying on Kuhl and Corcoran the court noted the distinctions
between utilization review and arranging for medical treatment, holding that
only utilization review will trigger the preemption provisions of ERISA. s6 In
382. Id.
383. Id,; see Visconti ex rel. Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097, 1105 (E.D.
Pa. 1994).
384. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357. In Roessert v. Health Net, 929.F. Supp. 343,350-51 (N.D. Cal.
1996), the district court citing Dukes held that ERISA did not preempt negligence claims
against an HMO for negligently advising a participating medical group to assist in the
psychiatric commitment of one of the HMO's subscribers, without appropriate consent from the
subscriber's spouse. The district court reasoned that the HMO's advice and the claim of
negligence were not related to benefits or enforcement of rights under the employee benefit
plan, but rather directed against the quality of benefits received. Roessert, 929 F. Supp. at 350-
51.
385. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 358; see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988). Recently in In re Estate
of Robert Frappier, Jr. v. Wishnov, 678 So. 2d 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1996) the court
held that ERISA did not preempt vicarious liability claims against an HMO. Id. at 887 (citing
Dukes v. United States Health Care Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994)). And in
Quellette v. Christ Hospital, 942 F.Supp. 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1996), the court relied on Dukes to
find that ERISA did not preempt an HMO subscriber's claims that financial incentive
arrangements between the HMO and its providers had the effect of undermining the quality of
care administered.
386. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 360-61. The court in Dukes did state that its holding was limited
to certain fact scenarios. See also Rice v. Hall, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that
members' malpractice claims against two doctors, and health plan administrator for malpractice
under a state law respondeat superior theory were not subject to complete preemption under
ERISA); Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that
ERISA did not preempt a state law claim that an HMO was vicariously liable for alleged
medical malpractice of one of its physicians when the claim did not involve administration of
benefits or the level or quality of benefits promised by the plan, but rather, reference to the plan
to determine the issue of agency with respect to the HMO and the physician); Prudential Health
Care Plan, Inc. v. Lewis, 1996 WL 77018, No. 95-6255 (10th Cir. Feb. 21, 1996) (stating that
just as ERISA does not preempt a malpractice claim against the doctor, it should not preempt
the vicarious liability claim against the HMO, if the HMO has held out the doctor as its agent);
Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Oklahoma, Inc., 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that
despite the preemption of state law damage claims resulting in the unavailability of a remedy
under ERISA, a health plan beneficiary is not denied access to justice in violation of the Fifth
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so finding, the court indicated that it is only in the utilization review role that
an entity is in a position to deny benefits due under an ERISA welfare plan.3"7
Finally, the Supreme Court in Varity Corp. v. Howe determined that the
language in § 1132(a)(3) did in fact allow individual beneficiaries to sue for
relief under ERISA.3 ss In Varity Corp., the plaintiffs were former employees
of Massey-Ferguson, Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Varity Corporation
(Varity).a8 9 The employees of these two entities were participants in, and
beneficiaries of, Massey-Ferguson's self-funded employee welfare benefit
plan."l Due to financial problems associated with some of Massey-Ferguson's
divisions, Varity developed a plan called "Project Sunshine" which called for
the transfer of various money losing divisions and other debts to a newly
created subsidiary of Massey-Ferguson called Massey Combines.3 9' The plan
also called for employees of the money losing divisions to switch employment
to the newly created subsidiary. For those employees who ultimately accepted
this proposal, Massey-Ferguson was effectively released from its obligation to
provide certain benefits. In addition, Varity also unilaterally assigned to
Massey Combines the benefit obligations it owed to over 4,000 workers who
had previously retired from Massey-Ferguson.392 Unbeknownst to the
employees and retirees, Varity was aware that Massey Combines was from the
start an insolvent company, and it eventually ceased operations. 393 In order to
sell its proposal to the employees, Varity intentionally overvalued the assets of
Massey Combines, which in reality had a $46 million negative net worth.39'
As a result of the artifice created by Varity which resulted in Massey Combines
failure, employees of Massey Combines along with the Massey-Ferguson
retirees whose benefit obligations had been assigned to the newly created
Amendment's Due Process clause).
387. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 360-61. Interestingly, in Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1996) the court decided that ERISA did not preempt a hospital's third-party claim that the
HMO was negligent in delaying transfer authorization for a patient suffering from an emergency
condition. Plaintiff originally sued the physician and hospital for permanent injuries suffered
as a result of the alleged transfer delay. Id.
388. 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996); see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988) which states:
a civil action may be brought ... by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to
enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of
the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).
389. Varity Corp., 116 S.Ct. at 1068.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 1068-69.




company lost significant benefits for which Massey-Ferguson would have been
obligated, but for "Project Sunshine".395 In holding that § 1132(a)(3) did in
fact allow individual beneficiaries to sue for relief under ERISA, the Court
resolved a conflict that had existed among the various circuit courts.396 The
Third, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits had previously held that §
11 32(a)(3) when applied to a claim of breach of fiduciary obligation, did not
authorize awards of relief to individuals, but rather only authorized lawsuits to
obtain relief for the plan.397 The impact of the Varity Corp. decision with
respect to emerging liability claims arising from utilization management and
financial incentive arrangements between health care providers and payers is
potentially significant in cases where the facts reveal egregious conduct by plan
administrators carried out in an effort to "save the employer money at the
beneficiaries' expense" 398 to such a degree that it adversely impacts upon the
"quality of benefits" received by the subscriber.39 In Varity Corp. the Court
may have, although unintentionally, created a legally enforceable duty of
loyalty extending beyond plan asset management to individual beneficiaries,
in contravention of established trust law by characterizing a denial of benefits
as a breach of fiduciary duty.400
In that recent cases addressing ERISA tend to reflect a trend toward a
narrowing of the preemption doctrine,4° 1 it is more than ever necessary that the
responsibilities and tasks of UM departments be kept separate and distinct from
those being carried out by arrangers and providers of health care. UM
departments must carefully identify and document all information establishing
a good faith foundation of support, to justify actions as appropriate and proper
in the event a decision is later challenged. Importantly, financial incentives
395. Id.
396. Id. See Mcleod v. Oregon Lithoprint, Inc., 46 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 1995); Bixler v.
Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993); Anweiler v.
American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 1993); Simmons v. Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co., 940 F.2d 614 (11 th Cir. 1991).
397. Varity Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 1069.
398. Id. at 1074-75.
399. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355-61.
400. Varity Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 1078. The Court rejected the argument of amici that the
Court's ruling will result in administrators interpreting plan documents as requiring payments
to individuals instead of trying to preserve plan assets. In Smith v. Texas Children's Hosp., 84
F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1996), the court, relying on Varity Corp., held that ERISA did not preempt
a fraudulent inducement claim asserted by a hospital's former employee arising from its alleged
misrepresentations which induced the employee to unknowingly give up accrued disability
benefits. Smith, 84 F.3d at 157.
401. See Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare of Connecticut, 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996).
ERISA does not preempt state laws created to protect consumers (who were subscribers of
managed care plan) from unfair business practices and a state law which required filing and
disclosure of information concerning preferred physician provider networks. Id.
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between providers and payers must not affect the quality of benefits received
by subscribers.
IX. CONCLUSION
Although in its infancy, managed care is now a recognized part of
America's health care delivery system. Recent studies reflect that the cost
containment mechanisms of managed care have reduced overall health care
costs and offer the potential for additional savings in the future. If managed
care is to meet the many expectations that have been placed on its shoulders,
it must be provided the opportunity to operate in an atmosphere free of
unreasonable regulation, legislation and litigation.

